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ABSTRACT
The collapse of the Northern cod stock and subsequentclosure of the fishery in
NAFO divisions 2J+3KL, is reflective of the worldwide crisis in fisheries management.
The uncertainty surrounding the future of this resource and the thousandsof people
dependent upon it has led10changes in the management process; however, the resource
allocation issue has not been resolved and as in the past remains a major source of
controversy.
This study examines the allocationsand catchesof Northern cod during the 1977
10 1991 period. This information is presented in the context of the stated goals and
objectives for the allocation of the resource, The study reveals that despite public
slatcments and publisheddocumentsof a priorityaccessto the inshore sector, the greater
part of the resource was allocated to other users such as the Canadian offshore fleet and
foreigncountriesaspart of Canada's bilateralagreements. This failure to adhere to stated
goalsandobjectiveswaslargelyowingto the overly optimisticresource projectionsof the
late 1970swhich projecteda 350,000-400,000 mt. totalallowable catch (rAe) by 1985
and estimatedthe inshorerequirementto beapproximately 230.CXX> mt.. These projections
opened the door for new users and allowed for foreign allocations which led 10 a
rcdistribution of the economic benefits of the Northern cod resource away from the
traditionalinshoresectorwhichwasto havebeen the principalbeneficiary of the 200 mile
limit. This euphoric phase of the late 1970s was followed by a period of uncertainty
during the 1980s, fuelled by the repea ted failure of the inshore fishery to harvest its
alloca tion of 115,000 mt. The crisis phase began in 1989 when scientis ts recommended
dramatic reductions in the total allowable catch . Unfortunately this advice was not taken
by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the TACs were set 01.1 more than twice the
advised level until the stock collapsed in 1992.
The stated goals and objectives of prio rity for the inshore sector were never
achieved and by 1986 the inshore fishery accounted for only 26% of the total catch. Now
that the fishery is closed there are a number of reports that restate the priori ty allocation
to the inshore sector and recommend that when the fi~I;t:"y reopens the firs t 100 ,000 1111 .
of catch beallocatedexclusively to the inshore fishery. It re mains to be seen if these goals
and object ives will be the corners tone of future allocation and manageme nt or like those
of the late 19705 and ea rly 19805 will be neither adhered to nor atta ined.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
A clear research priority for geographers. if we arc to contribute to
fisheries management, is toconduct hindsight evaluations of specific
resource allocations, and 10 relate these to the needs of future
organizati on for fisheries management. (Draper 1981)
The Newfound land and Labrador grcundflsh fishery is in a state of crisis with
nearly all of the traditional fisheries dosed and the ground fish stocks at, or ncar, the
lowest level of abundance ever recorded. The social and economic impact has been
severe, with between 30,000 to 40,000people negatively affectedand now dependent upon
Federal assistance programs for a port ion or all of their livelihood (Cashin 1993).
Both Federal and Provincial governments and the entire fishing industry am
grappling with low resource prospects and the looming problem o f capacity reduction in
the harvesting and processing sectors and, in this context, Iisherics mana gement and
allocation are subjects of considerable debate throughout Atlantic Canada. In
Newfoundland and Labrador it is often stated that in the inshore sector there are "100 many
fis hermen chasing too few fish" and that this fundamental problem must beaddressed.
Despite the curre nt low level 01 the Northern cod stock upon which many of these
fishermen have historically depended, the size of the future inshore fishery will depend
upon more thanthe recovery of the stock. The allocation or sharing of the Northern cod
stock wiUbecritical in deciding thefuture of the inshore sector since it will determine the
amount of fish available. Only after the allocation issue is settledcan the harvesting and
process ing componen ts of the inshore and offshore sectors be rationalized, based on
resource availabili ty.
Despite the principleofallocation, that reflects adjacency and history, and despite
tilestatedobjectivesgiving inshore fishermen priority access to theNorthern cod made in
the late 1970s, the inshore fishermen's share of Northern cod hasbeen steadilyeroded.
Despite theobjections of traditional users, the Government o f Canada ignoredwarnings
of inshorcfishermen and scttotat allowable catches (TACs) whichir. retrospect were too
high and thenallocated the lions' shareof Northern cod 10 foreign countries, the Canadian
offshore sector and new entrantsfromother regions. The inshore fixed-gear sector's share
of the Northern cod stock, which had historically been 85~90% of the total catch, and
nearly 100% of the Canadian share, was thus eroded to less than 50 % of the Canadian
allocation by 1986. Preliminary analysis of catch statistics indicates that the inshore
fishery accounted foronly approximately 25% of the totalcatch becauseof the low level
of the resourceanrlthe high level of catches by foreign vessels outside of 200 miles.
Thefailuretoadhere tostated objectives, to follow the principlesof allocation, to
acknowledge the warnings and concerns of the traditional users, to deal with the
overflshing outside of 200 miles and to set total allowable catches (TACs) based on the
scientific advice hOIV''':all cont ributed to the overexploitation and subsequent collapseof the
Northern codstock. In the wake of the catastrophe, the inshore fishery is again stated to
have priority of access to the first 100,000 to 115 ,000 metric tonnes (Governmentof
Newfoundland and Labrador 1993; Cashin 1993; DFO 1995); however, these stated
objectives echo thoseof the late 1970swhen the Northerncod stock was projectedto be
growingbeyondthe needs or harvestingcapabilities of theinshore sector (DFO 1979) and
was allocated to other sectors to address overcapacity problems in the harvesting sector
elsewherein AUantic Canadaand to satisfy thedemands of foreign nations underhitateral
agreements.
This thesiswill conducta hindsight evaluation of the allocation of the Northern cod
stock in the 1977 to 1991 period by documenting stated allocationobjectives and actual
deci sions; by examining the al locationprocess; by analyzing past allocations andactual
catc hes and by identifying the spatial impacts of the allocations. In addition. the
importanceof goalsand objectivesin future allocationand resource management processes
will bediscusscd.
1.1 Global Crisis in Fisheries Management
The stewardship of marine fisheries is one of the most difficult resource
management problems facing mankind. In recent years the concepts of sustainable
deve lopment and resource conservation have received considerable attention; however,
mar ine resources are still characterized by "boom and bust" fisheries, resource over-
exploitation and increasing conflict betweenUSC:' , be they individual fishermen, gear
sectors, regions or nations. The extractionof fish from the ocean is often termed "the last
wild harvest". for mankindhas not beenable to managefisheriesresourceson a sustainable
basis withover-exploitation, destruction of habitat, lost growth potentialand commercial
extinctionbeing thena nn (Leopold 1948; Cole-King 1993; Acheson 1981; Ludwiget al.
1993 ; Walters 1986).
Curreeuy,marine fisheries are ina stateof crisis worldwide, withthe majorityof
fish stocksover-exploitedor in a Slate of collapse (Ludwig et al. 1993; Hinds 1992; FAO
1994). Canada is noexception; groundfish populatioosin Atlantic Canada areat or near
the lowest level of abundance ever recorded, and most fisheries have been closed.
Northern codwas!helargestgroundfish stockin Atlantic Canadabut a number of studies
havedocumented i15 over-exploitation andthemanagement decisions thatled10 its collapse
(Steele a af.1992; Hutchings and Myers 1994; Haedrich 1994; Martin 1995). The
biological collapseandsubsequent fisheriesclosures have alsoresultedin negauve social
and economicimpactsthroughout Atlantic Canada and especially in Newfoundlandand
Labrador which IWS heavily dependent upon groulldfishand particularlyuponthe Northern
codstock(Storey 1993; Cashin 1993; Hamiltonandseyfrit 1994).
1.2 FlsherlesAllocations
Thecollapseof thegroundfish fishery in Atlantic Canadahas also resultedin a
reviewoffisheries management andhasled10dramatic changes in the Canadiandecision-
making processwithrespect to the level atwhich fishpopulations shouldbe harvested.
TheFishcrics Resource Conservation Council (FRCe) was createdas a "councilfor the
fish"to replace theindustryadvisoryprocess which focuscd on allocations, often to tile
detrimentof theresource.
Unfortunately, todatetherehasbeen no replacement mechanismto allowinputof
theusergroups intothe resourceallocation process. Because most stocksareclosed,the
absence of such a process has not received much attention . However, as fish stocks
rebuild, it is recognized that considerable industry downsizing must occur . The harvesting
and proces sing of ground fish in co ming years wi1llik ely provide approximately 50% of
thejobs andeconomic benefits seen in the 1980s (Cashin 1993: 56) . and the fight for the
fishwill besubject to inc redible confli ct betw een regions. provi nces. fleet sectors, towns
and individual fishermen . In this respect, the allocation proce ss is equall y as important
a s the rebuilding of fish stocks because a rebuilt resource will not generate economic
activity unless it can be accessed thro ugh the allocation process .
The need to addres s the resou rce alloca tion issue is best summari zed in the report
of the recent Task Force on Inco mes and Adj ustments in the Atlantic Fishery:
The curre nt resourc e crisis will not be solved, nor will the
chronic over-capacity in the harvesting sector, by laking o ne
fleetsector's allocation and g iving it to another fleet sec tor.
Beyond the issues of allocation among fleet sectors , there is
the linkage between coastal areas and the resour ces upon
which they have traditionally relied. Sometimes , what is
presented as fleet sector or gear technology issues are reall y
demands from one coastal area tohave resources reallocated
to them from another . This is no way to decide the future
of coastal areas and the resou rces upon which Ihey have
traditionally relied (Cash in 1993. p.65) .
Despite this loomin g confli c t, the Government o f Canada has not addre ssed the
issue of resource alloca tion and has , in fact , moved away from it'! staled allocation
principl es and set up "spec ial" prog rams whi ch undermi ne the pastprinci ples and stated
objectives of fisheries al location. The "Principles of Allocation - which were the
romerstone of the groundfish management plan during the 1980s were re named"Essential
Blcments " in 1993 and are now called ·Guidclines~ (DFO An nualAtlanticGro undfish
Managernctlt Plans 1982-95). Th is weakening of the rul es has a1Jowed regional
reanocauoe of resources and is exactly the problem the Cashin Task Force (1993)
described .
T he challenge for the com ing years is to develop an equitable and consistent
allocation policy for Canada which will treat all regions and user groups fai rly. An
importantand vital component of this policy must be clearly-statedgoals andobjectives
(Barber andTaylo r 1990) which should be developedthrough full pub lic consultation.
Once these goals and objectivesare established, the annual "fight for the fish" willbe
greatly diminished. andthe rational ization of anindustrycan proceedon aregional and
fleet sector basis. The fishing industry and bothlevels of government maythen beable
10 focus on resource conservation instead of theage old conflict over d ividing the pie.
1.3 Geograph y and Resource Allocation
Resource managementisdefinedby O'Riordanas"a p rocesso f decision-making
whereby resources~ al located over spaceand time according to the needs. aspi rations
anddesires of man within the framework of his technological inventiven ess, his political
andsocial institutionsand his I~ and administretive arrangements· (Mitchell 1979). The
processof resourcemanagementis often seen as aprocessof "muddling thro ugh" (Krueger
a nd Mitchell 1977) owing to me vast arra y of biological, social, economic , legal,
institu tional , techno logical an d political perspectives which must be incorporated at
differing spatial and temporal scales (Figure 1.1). In aucmpling 10 improve resource
ma nagement, it is necessary to evalu a te past management deci sions; o ne of the best
mechanisms tojudge thesuccess or failure ofthe pastprocess is to e xamine the alloca tim
of resources.
Geog raphy is uniquein its abilityto be inte grative (Spooner 1990) and areview nf
resource geog raphy by Ferguson and Alley (1 984) suggests that some la rger view is
necessary to understand how geograph y fils w ithin the complex rcsoercc-msnagcm cnt
fr a mework . "Allocation processes o ffer one means o f forming such a framework'
(Fergusonand Alley 1984). The examin ation o f thespatial SC<'.1e hasalso been centra l to
geography. In examining resourcemanagement, theultima te goal for geographers"should
be to understand spatial allocations of resou rces.;" (Krueger and Mit chell 1971).
Resou rcealloca tion is a central theme of resource geography and o ffers a means
to evaluate themanagement p rocess. T he role of geog raphers in resource analysis was
reviewedby Mitchell (1979) wh o iden ti fied four areasof research : 1) Stud ies of natu ral
resource s the mselve s.. ,,2) S tudies of alternative alloca tions (spatial, tempora l and
functional)•••3) Studies of vari ableswhich cond ition resourceallocation.. . and 4) Stud ies
of th e impac t of specific resource allocation" (M itchell 1979).
In re v iewing the future and poten tial contribution of the role of geographers to
fisheries man agement , Draper (1981) recommended h indsight eval uation of resource
allocati ons:
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A clear research priority for g eographers if we are 10
understand and contribute to fish eries management, is to
conduct hindsight eva luations of specific resource
allocations, and 10 relat e these to the needs of future
organizationsfor fisheries management
In the context of Newfoundland and lab rador, Drapersugg estedtha t
Geographerscan andshould explore such areas includ ing the
issuesof inshore/offshore tradeoffs .. .lwhichl combined with
the do mestic-fo reign allocation pr oblem on theeast coast,
willneed to be analysed in a broad way in recognit ionof
regional econom ic differences.
Unfo rtunately , since 19 81very little research has beendon e with re spectto the
fisheriesallocation issuesidenti fiedby Draper.
1.4 Pur poseof Study
Thepu rpose of this study is todocu ment fisheries resourceallocation d ecisions and
their impactswithrespecttothe Northern cod(21+3KL) stock in the 19n to 1991peri od.
This will be accomp lishedthrough hind sight ev aluation (as suggested by Draper) of
inshore/offshore splits and foreign allocat ions and catches in the context o f the sta led
allocationobjectives. Theimplicationsfo r future resourceal location and mana gement will
also bediscussed.
Thiss tudywill focuso n thepast managem entand allocatio n of the Northern cod
stoc k to achieve the following o bjectives: (Hypothesisshown in Brackets)
to docu ment lh e alloca t ion of the Northern cod !.1ock frum 1977 t il
1991;
2) t o I~ratt lbeshifts ill resccrees wh ich look place between the
imbort. offshore and foreign seec rs ...hkh alT« ltd tht regio na l
d i.\1ribu tl on of the rcsoun:e;
(Gi\Ullhe CfIIJiIasis onildj~, historicdependency and prio rily
o f a.a:css to theresou rceby inshoresector iI.is hypothesized that th t
inshorewould sec its share o f theresource te creee.j
3) t o identify andeva tua ethe priorities for the allocatio n ofthe Northe rn
c od resource In te rms of staled ebjeetbes a nd actua l decisions;
( It is hypothesized th at there is nodi f ference between th e stated objectives
of allocation and th e actual al location decisio n . Staled goals from reports
will becompared to actual a llocation decision s ingroun dfish man agemen t
plansand quotarepo rts.)
4) to discus:sthe Impa rlance or goalsand objectivesIn tbe resou rc e
a llocatio n process and draw implications for fuluR rl'iheri es
a ucesncn and management.
1.S Ju stifi cat ion for Research
Research can mak e .I co ntributio n to the literatu re from a metbodological ,
theore tical and applied pcnpccti ve . Reso urce geography research o ften has a strong
applied dimension ; however, theo lheraspects areequally lmporant. The contri bution o f
this thes is to the theore tical aspect of resource-m anageme nt is its deeelop me et of a
mechanism to conduct hindsight evaluati ons of resource management deci sions b y
docume nting r esoerce-allocation decisio ns , descri bing ho w they d iffer from stated
objectives andiIluslrnling howsuch decisions affect th e spatial distributi o n of the resource.
Becaus e of the vast array of intera cting fac tors to be taken into consideration when
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managing natural resources, t~e failures greatly outnumber the successes; however .
improvi ng resource management in thefuture depends upon theevaluation of resource-
allocation decisions andprocessessincethese are the only means to document and analyze
pastdecisions (M itchell 1979).
Ve ry little work has beendone on the evaluation of resource allocation decisions
in erms of theallocation precess. Elsterin his 1992 review of allocation processes staled
that 'there have been virtually no attemptsto study the whole range of questions of this
kind, and to develop aconceptualand theoretical framework to describe and exp lain how
institutions allocate goodsand burde ns' (Elste r 1992) . The inclusion of goals, obj ectives
and values in the resource-allocationprocess is also seen as a critical component of
effective fisheries management (Barberand Taylor 1990).
From an applied perspectivethe al location of fisher ies resources is the most
contltct- p rodectng typeof managementdec ision (Hanna and Smith 1993). Sin ce the
declarat ion of the Canadian 200 mile limit in 19n, the sharing of Atlantic Canada's
groundfish resources hasbeen subject to great debateand conflict, usually to the d etriment
of the resource. The current low biological level o f the resourcehas resulted in a new
proces for resourc e conservation which has placed the biologicalhealth of the resource
aboveall other con cerns (FRCC 1993). No suchprocessor mechanismhas been put in
place to deal with tne al location of fisheri es resources despite the fact that resource
allocation is themo st controversial aspect of fisheries management. The battle lines have
11
been dr awn and once stocks begin to recove r the confli ct will again intensify (Martin
1995).
F rom a spa tial perspective the economic future of many communities and entire
regions depe nds upon access to resources whi ch are controlled and allocated by national
or internationalorgan izations. These communities are not able to influence lIleal location
policy and arc often not privy to the decision-making process, yet they are vulnerabl e to
nationaland internationalallocation decisions which result in negative social and econom ic
impacts a t the local and/o r regional level. Since Draper (1981) identified fi sheries
allocation as anarea forgeographers to examine, the groundfish fishery in Newfou ndland
and Labrador has gone from a period of high catches and optimism to a time of closed
fisheries and deep pessimism .
This thesis will illustrate how the allocation p rocess is a critical component of
fisheries manageme nt and will emphasize the importance of goals and objectives upon
spatialand sectoral inconsistencies in the resou rce allocation process. Since lhe A mu1ree
Commission in 19 33 it has been repeatedly stated that there are ; ' teo many fishermen
chasing too fewfish" in Newfoundland and Labrador (Blake 1994); the allocation decisions
of the pa st 18 year s have not addressed this perceived problem. In fact, the national
allocation policy for Northern cod, despite its stated objec tives. has increased the access
of newusers and diverted significant amounts of fish to other regions and countries at the
expense of traditional users and dependent regions, thereb y, exacerbating the problem .
12
In Parsons' (1993) review of fisheries management in Canada lhe process of
resourceallocationis described as "sharing a limited pie· (Parsons1993:156» . Themost
recentreview of AtlanticCanada'sfisheryslatestha t 50%of the harvestingand processing
capacity must be removed from the industry and that downsizing must be done o n it
regional basis by industry renewalboards. Such boards should"definethe geograp hic
areas within which harvesting capacity reduction take place" (Cashin 1993:39).
Obviously, balancing the numbers of fishermen withthe resourcebase is affected by
resource allocation. The CashinTask Force goes on to statethat "Capacity reduction
should be based on the principle that coastal areas would maintain priority access to
resourcesupon whichthey havetraditionally relied" (page40), and that the inshore fishery
would have pri ority access to the Northern cod stock for the first t 15,000 mt. Th c.'OC
wordsecho those of the reportsof the late 1970sand more recent documents suchas the
HarrisPanel(1990), the Dunne Report (1990) and the Govemmento f Newfoundland and
Labrador's "Changing Tides" document (1993). In theory, such statements should gi ve
directionand provide goalsand objectives to theallocation process,yet, unless theprocess
changes, the future allocation of Northern cod will likely continue to be a misguided
process of "muddling through" drivenby crisis management.
The following chapter will identify the data sources and methodology used to
conductan evaluation of pastallocations of the Northerncod resource and to identify past
goalsand objectives. Chapter3 will review theevolution of the allocation processand the
principles of g roundfish allocation in Canada. Ch apter 4 details the pastallocation and
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catc hes of Northern cod in the 19n-9 1 period and shows how thoseallocations and
catches compare tothe slated objectives. Theimpact of al location decisions are given in
ChapterSwhich examinesthesta ledversus actua l decisions, theeco nomic impact of the
dec is ions and thespatial shift of there sourcewhich occurred as the result o f allocation
decisions. Chapter 6 reviewsthe statemen ts ofgoals andobjectivesin the 197 7-91period
and focuses on the allocation goals and objectives in recent documentsrel ating to the
"fishery of the future". 'The findings and conclus ions are givenin Chapter 7 alongw ith
suggestions for futur e research with respect to resource allocation and the spatial
implications of allocation decisions. The need for clearly stated allocation goals an d
objectivesis also discussedin termsofclarificationof the fisheriesallocation dec isions an d
in the future evaluation of the management process.
14
Chapter 2: Ap proach and Methodology
2.1 St udyAre a
This study will examine the allocation of the stock of cod (Gadus .mmhu:1)
commonly referred to as Northern cod in tile waters off the Northeast coa st of
Newfound landand Labrador, inthe Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization's(NArO)
divisions 21, 3K and 3L (Figure 2.1). Within these divisions it is recognized that a
number of sob-components of thestock may exist; however, the stockis managed as (lIIC
discreetunit (Lear andParsons 1993) andit is treatedhereas such.
The management of thecod stock is done by Canada on the basis of theentire stock
area; however. land ingsare often reported on a smaller geographicalscale cg. community
orNAFO Division 21or3 K. Likewise.jandings orccd fromstock area2J + 3KL in 0011-
adjacent areasof the Provinceor AtlanticCanadacan be documentedfrom theCanadian
Atlantic Q uotaReport. The unregulatedforeign fishery whieh occurs outsideCanada's
two hundred mile limittakes place in NAFO division 3L in an areaknownas the Nose
of lheBank . Indocumenting pastmanagement and allocation decisions, and the resultant
spatial shifts in the distributionof the Northern codreso urce, referenceswill be made to
theGulfRegion(4RSTand 3Pn), the Scotian Fundyreg ion (4VWX)an d to thesouth coast
o f Newfoundland (3Ps)
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2.2 Background
The allocation of theNorthern cod stock is documented inannualpublications such
as the AtlanticGroundfish Management Planand theCanadian Atlantic QuotaReport.
While there arenoacademic publications dealing specifically with tileallocation of the
Northern cod stock,a number of papers (Harris1990,Storey1993, Steele t'I al 1992,
Parsons1993, LearandParsons 1993)dealwith theoverallmanagement ofl hc resource .
The study of the allocation process is a research areain resource geography which is
receivingincreasing attention; Mitchell(1979), reviewed therole of the geographer;Hann
and Smith(1992) reviewedthe role of allocation connict in resource management, and
Pinkerton (1989) reviewed thescale at whichallocationdecisionsare made.
Whilenoacademicstudieshave focusedspecifically on the eltccatioe of Northern
cod, there is a significant amount of literature on the stock which makes specific
recommendationswithrespect10 howit should beallocated. In the contest of Canada's
managementof theNorthern cod resource, thefirst detailed studyto focus on allocation
was thepublished account of theNortherncodseminarentitled 'Towards a Policy for the
Udlizationof Northem Cod"(DFO 1979) which was heldinComerBrook in 1979. This
studyprojected that the future growth of the Northerncodstockwouldallowd harvest of
350,000 to 400,000mt, The inshore sharebasedon its historic catch was defined as
230,000 mt. and lIM.: remainder wasto beallocated 10theCanadianoffshore sector and
foreign nations underbilateral tradeagreements (DFO1979). During theearl) 1980s the
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Kirby TaskForce(1983) alsomadeallocation recommendations for Northern cod based
on the factthat thestock was growingbeyond theneedsof the inshoresector. During
19&6, the Government ofNewfoundlandand Labrador published'Strength fromlheSea'
expressingconcern overtheallocation of Northerncodto newusers fromotherprovinces
whilethe traditional inshorefishery was failing . In 19&7, the Alverson TaskForce
attempted tocxpjaln the continuing failureof the inshorefishery andalscrotedthepriority
ofacces tothe inshore sector. In thissameyeartheGovernment of Newfoundland and
Labrador produced ' Northern Cod Under Attack' in response toa proposal fromNova
Nord, a QucbecJNewBrunswick consortium,foranallocation of 10,000mt.of Northern
cod.
The Harris Panel in 1990 providesoneof the best overviews of the allocation issue
and stressesthe needfor clearly staled goalsand objectives for the management and
allocation of Northern cod. The DunneReport on the ' Implementation of the Harris
Panel 's Recommendations' stated thatpriority accessbe given10theinshoresectorbased
on its dependency, history andadjacency (OFO 1990). Following the closureof the
fishery for Northern codin 1992, thefocus of most publications shifttd. fromtheallocation
of theresource todealing withthesocial andeconomicconsequences of thecollapse. The
social and economicissues have now been largely addressed through TheAtlantic
IhoundtishStrategy (TAGS) andatlet1lion hasreturned to theallocation issue. The Cashin
TaskForcereportis veryclear in itsstatements with respectto the future allocatioo of
Northern codinlennsof givingpriorityaccessto theinshore fisheryfor the first115,000
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mt. Likewise, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador policy paper entitled
·Changing Tides' (1993) recommends that the first 100,000 mt. of Northern cod be
allocated totheinshorefisherywiththeallocation ofanyfutureincreases to bedecldedby
public hearings. It is important to notethat thenewreference levelof 100,00010 115,000
mt. reflectsthe inshorecatch in the past 15 to20yearsandis approximately 50%of the
230,000 mt. long-term averagecatch which was the referencepointduring the late 1970s.
Theaforementioned reports outline pastand fulure goals andobjectives withrespect10
allocation of the Northern cod resourceandprovidea benchmark 10 evaluate the past
management. A review of thosevarious reports, comparing goalsand objectives and
integrating those sources is an integralpartof this study. A detailed assessmentof the
management andallocationproces is providedinChaptcr 3.
2.3 Data Sourcesand Methodology
Northern codin 2J+3KL has been reported as a unitsince 1951, with the data
presentedon an annual basis. A major problem in conducting analysis of fisheries
informationis thelack of a databasewhich is completefromboth a chronological and
spatial perspective. Foreign catchesare reported in the NAFOStatiyical Bulletin,
whereas, Canada's quotas andcatchesarereported in the CanadianAtlantic QuotaReport.
In addition, theinformation is presented in a format which makesthe analysisof spatial
distribution of the resource difficult with landings beingreported in different publications
by country, region, fleet sectorand community. This thesiswill examine different
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5latisticaldatabasesacrossboth thespatialand1efTlpocal timeperiodin question10 provide
a basis00 which IOcvaluate Ihechanges whichoccurredoverthe 1m 101992period.
1.3.1 Data Sources
The focus of this thesis is the allocation of the Northern cod resource. Unlike
alchcs, allocationsareclearly identified and no! subject to thesame disputesanddebates
with respect to accuracy. Catches are used to supplement the allocation data and to
illustrate howcatchesoftendiffer fromallocations, as in the caseof foreigncatcheswhich
exceeded its allocationand the inshoresector which did notcatchits allocation. Catch
dataarc alsousedto illustrateshifts in the spatial distribution of landingson a regional
ba!is strceallocations, although not assigned 10communities or regions, indirectly
dctermlne wherefISh is landed.
The annual )'e2t end Canadian Atlantic Quota Report and the annualAtlantic
Groundfish Management Planare the primary sourcesof dataon the allocation to and
eatebbyCanadianf1cdS. Theforeign catchis takenfrom NAFOstatisticalbulletinsand
Olher sources such as Lear and Pmons (1993). The NAFOlandings dal1 base is
problematicfor the late 1980$ and 1990swhen the conflict between Canada and the
European Unionintensined. It is suspected thatlandings maynotbeas lowas statedin
theNAFOSl.a.tisticalBulletin. Ir.deed, Canada's aerialsurveysof the 3Lareacalled the
Noseof the Bank revealeffortandcatches inexcessof thosereported to NAFO. Thus,
for the purpose of thisanalysis, the foreigncatchof Northerncodas reportedshould be
treated as the minimumamount harvested.
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TheCanadian fisheries landing dataarelessof a problem sincetheoffshore fleets
were underquotamanagement and weresubject to closureduringthe 1977-82 period.
While discarding was a problem duringIhe early yearsof the enterprise allocation
program, by 19861heoffshore harvest was subject to full coverage byobservers, The
inshore catch isestimated by purchaseslips which are issued forall sales. In addition,
DFOestimates the amount caughtbut not soldduring each month(Chen1994). Giventhe
factthattheinshorewasonanallowancesystem, therewas00 reason to mis-report catch.
Theallocation between nations andbetweensectorswithin Canadais found inIhe
Al1antic Groundfish Management Plan, Theallocation is established at the beginningof
each year and is not likely 10changeduring the year because of the intense connict
between thedifferent users.
Thestated goalsandobjectives ofallocation arefound in special studies, ta.~k force
reports, and annual management plans. Northern cod wasthe major stockin Mlantic
Canada duringthe study period andtherearea large number of published reportsdealing
wjththeallocationof that resource.
1.3.2 Methodology
Draper (1981) slatedthatgeographers should conduct hindsight evaluations of the
inshoreandoffshore tradeoffs, but did notoffera method to conduct suchevaluations.
Obviously, sincethe landing portsof the inshore andoffshore Canadian fleetsand the
foreign fleetsaregeographically separate, theallocation toandcatchby eachsector affects
thegeographicdistributionofthc landingsand hence lhedistribution of economic benefits.
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The methodchosen to conduct the hindsightevaluation as suggested by Draper
(1981) is toidentifythestatedallocation goals andobjectives frompublished reportsand
thenexamine the subsequent allocationsto determine whethertheallocation objective was
achieved. This will test the hypothesis with respect to the expected increase in the
inshore's share of the Northern codresource. Catches arealsousedin the evaluationsince
theinshoresector was not able to catchits allocation.
The annual allocation and catch data presented in the Atlantic Groundfish
Management PlansandtheCanadian AtlanticQuotaReportsarecombined withthe foreign
allocation andeach datafromthe NAFOdata basetoprovide datafrom1977101991 that
illustratea timeseriesof theshiftsin theallocations and resultant catchesof the resource
amongdifferent users. This completedata basefor thestock doesnot currentlyexist in
the titeramre and will providethe basis for a quantitative analysis of tilechangesin
allocation which occurred incomparisonto thequalitativeobjectives.
To illustrate the shift in the spatial distribution of the resourceover time, the
portion of ille2J+3KLstocklanded ineachNAFO divisionis shown, as wellas thetop
15 1anding sitesfromthecommunity landings data base, Bothsources of informationare
available from DFOstatistics andcan be uSlX1 toillustrate largescalespatialshifts. In
both cases, the shift from North to Southis theresultof allocation decisions which
increasedallocations to the offshoresectorand thus lowered theshare available to the
inshore sector.
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Chapter 3: Fisheries Resource Allocation
Historically, allocation of fi~cs t'eSOUTCCS reveals a
decided lack of sophistication. From man'! earliest
existence. .•fish and game resources allocation was a
function of brute forte. In recent times political stn::ngth
has been substituted for physical strength. (Stroud ~l aI.
1980)
The management of marine fisheries bas evolved from Huxley's concepI of
inexhaustible seas (Smith 1995) 10 the realization thai resources are finite and that
excessive fishing pressure can reduce fish populations 10 the point of commercial and
biological extinction. In order to "control" or managethe impact of mankind upon Ilsh
resources, variousmanagementmeasures have evolvedwhich restrict spatial access. limit
theamount10bebarvesed, and restrictgear types and fishing seasons. A key component
of thesemanagementmeasuresis theallocationof fISheries resourceswhichdetermines the
spatial, temporal and technological restrictions placed upon fishermenand also delermines
the distribution of economic benefit from the common property resources. The purpose
of this section is to review lhe history of fisheries managemenl with emphasis on the
resourceallocation processin the context of the groundfish fishery in the Northwest
Atlanticand, in particular, the Northern cod fishery. This will providea backgroundto
the allocationprocess and provide a data baseto evaluatethe changes in allocation in the
1977to 1992 period.
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3.1 Historyof Management up to 1977
Thesetllement of Newfoundland and Labrador is historically linkedtotheharvest
of marine resources thaioccurredinabundance in thecoastalandoffshoreareas. Nonhem
cod was the "raison J'elrt" of the vast majority of settlements along the coastof
northeastern Newfoundland and Labrador (Harris it a) 1990; Copes1980)withtheIsland
viewedas "the great ship moored near the fishing banks" (Harrisit a/ 1990). This
gcographic advantage held forhundreds of yearsas the inshore fixed-gear fisherycenttcd
around theannualmigration ofcodto thecoast. During theperiod fromthe 15005 to the
190Jstherewas virtually no managementin theformof licences, TACs,meshsizes, etc.
Therewas, however, spatial separation of fishingareasbetween differentnations withthe
Frenchand English occupying different geographic regions (eg. the Frer.ch Shore).
However, the major constraintwas the forces of nature in termsof geographic, physical
andseasonal limitations. When fishdidnotshow upor iceconditions prevented a harvest,
it ....'35 generally seen as 'one for thefish"(N. Bates 1995Pers. Comm.). Theabsence of
a management regimedidnotjeopatdize thehealth of thegroundfish stocksand indeedthe
Nonhem cod fishery from 1850 to 1950could beviewed as a model of stAbility and
sustainable resource usage (Harrisit at 1m : 23. Fig3.1).
Thedevelopment ofcue r trawl and freezi ngtechnologyvasuy changed theharvest
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Figure 3. 1: Historic Landings of Northern Cod
From: Harris er at. 1990; page 23
of manyfisheriesresourcesworldwide. This wasespecially true for the Northerncod
stoekas thedevclopment of the factory freezer trawler duringthe 1950s 1ed to a dramatic
increase in total harvest and a change in the spatial and temporal limitations on the
resource. Theallocation of theresource duringthe1950s and1960s wasnot an issuesince
the fisheryessentially operatedasa free-for-all withverylimitedcontrols on the overal
harvest; however,asoffshoreeffort increased the inshore fishery by 1974 had plummeted
to less than 20%of its long termaverage(Harris tt 011990). As theexploitation of the
high seas iracnnfied in the post-war era, internationalorganizationswere formed to
monitor and eventually manage fish stocksfound in international waters. The International
Convention on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) wasformedin 194910provide
scientificand statistical information to those participating in the fishery . It made early
attempts 10regulatemeshsize and,in 1972, established TACs. However, ' as an agency
forconservationICNAF wasa lotal failure" (Hanis et 011990) sincethe totalallowable
catcheswereestablished at levels whichwerenot restrictive10 the fishing fleets. The
foreign effort inereased dramatically duringthe 1960s andas a result Ihe unregulated
harvestof Northern cod peaked at 810,000mt. in 1968(Harris t / 01 1990; Learand
Parsons 1993). The Northern codstocksubsequentlycollapsed,and in 1977Canada
declareda 200 mite limit (Figure3.2) in a belatedattempt to controlthe situation.
In retrospect, it iseasytoblame ICNAF for its failurein themanagement of the
Northern codslock during the 19505, 19605 and19105. 11 mustberemembered, however,
thattheover-cxploitauonofmarine resourceswasoccurringon a world-widebasisduring
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the l%Osand1970s (Hinds 1992, Ludwig tl aJ1993,WCED1987). Indeed, theinability
of mankindtocontrolor manage tc<:hnologywasa factor behind theUnitedNations Law
of theSeaConventionwhichextended therights of coastal statesto 200 nautical miles,
wilhtheintention of ending twodecadesof over-exploitation. Duringthesetwodecades
the traditionalinshorecatchof Northern codhad continuouslydeclined from average
landings of between 200,000to 250,000nn, duringtheearly 1900s to 172,000 mt. by
1956 and a lowof 35,000rot. in 1974 (Harriset aI 1990; NORDCO 1981 ; Lear and
Parsons 1993). The social and economic impact of this declinewaaenonnousas tens of
thousands of JX:OPle abandoned thefisheryasa meansof livelihoodand manycommunities
were deserted(Harris tl al l990; Parsons1993; Blake1994). Canada wasinvolvedin
extensive negotiationsin the 1958 to 1977period with theother nations of the world
regardingthemanagement of marine resources. The plightof coastalcommunities which
were adjacentto and historically dependentupon the Northerncodresourcewas central
to Canada's argumentsat the United Nations Lawof theSeaConferencefor extended
jurisdictionof itsexclusive economic zone.
Themassive o~'erflslljng ofmarineresourceswhich hadoccurred on a world wide
basis during the 1960sand 19705 lead to increasing pressures for change in the
managementofthc:oceans. The"freedom of thehigh seas"endedin 19n because "the
technologicalrevolution createda legal andpoliticalvacuum which was rtIled by this
international law conceptin a surprisingly brief period" (Evensen 1985 as quoted in
Parsons 1993:243). Thus,in 19n Canadagainedcontrol of a vast fisheryzoneand the
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spatial allocation of access becamea major component of fisheries management for both
foreign nations wanting to fish inside the zone and for Canadian fishermen within the
3.2. Canadian Management after 1977
3.2.1 The Spati al Allocation of Access
The United Nations Law of theSea effectively brought about an end to decadesof
massive over-exploitation by vast fleets of factory freezer trawlers from Europeand 1:"1SI
Block countries. As a result of the Lawof the Sea Agreement. the resource management
process and Uteallocation processshifted from the international scale to the national scale
(Figure 1.1). Canada subsequently implemented regional restrictions on uccnses.1011
vessel movements, an example of which was Sector Management which allowed for
regional management of resources (DFO t985).
3.2,1.1 The Two Hundred Mile Limit
On January I, 1977 Canada declared a 200 nautical mile fishing zoneon the
Atlantic coast encompassing 503,000 square miles (Parsons 1993). The worldwide
acceptance of exclusive economic zonesallowed most countries to extend thd r area of
control over fisheries through customary international law, since the Law of the Sea
Conventionhas still not beenratified.
The access to the Canadianzone by foreign vessels remains a very contentious
issue. Under the terms of the Law of the Sea, resources which arc surplus to Canada's
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needs must be allocated to ether nations. Following the extension of jurisdiction,
Canadian fishermen expanded their harvesting capacity and gradually harvested all
"surplus" fisheries resources for whichthese fleetshad marketsor could fish profitably.
However, during the 1980sCanadaallocated non-surplusamounts of Northern cod to
counl.ries in exchange for marketaccess and cooperation in the management of Northern
codandotherstocks whichstraddlethe 200 mile limit.
3.2.1.2 Sector Management
Managing 503,000 squaremilesof ocean asa unit provedto be impossible and
following the extensionof jurisdiction restrictions on access were implemented on a
regional basis. In orderto allowfor regional planningandto developfisheries in linewith
the local resourcebase, the Government of Canadaimplementeda sector management
policyon January I , 1982(Figure 3.3). Thepolicy appliesto all inshore vessels less lhan
65 ft. (19.8 metres) which fish groundfish. It allows for decentrafizadon of the
management of the inshore fishery 10 the regionalheadquarterslevel, and allowseach
regiun to respond quickly 10 local fisheries problems and align fishing effort to the
resourceavailability (DFO 1985).
Whileit is perceived thai fishermen in Newfoundlandand Labrador were the major
beneficiaries of this policy, it was actually implemented to prevent vessels based in
Southwest NuvaScotiafromfishing in theGulfo fS!. Lawrence (Parsons 1993:137). The
sectormanagement policyalsoaffected theSCJ.Ie of decision-makingby allowing for more
regional input. During the 1980sthe sectormanagement plan, which limitedaccessof the
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Figure3.3: The Three Sector Management Are:u on the Atlantic Coast
Prom: Parsons 1993; page 138
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inshore fishery to resources on a regional basis, came under continuous attack and there
was a continued erosion of the policy which negatively impacted upon the fishermen of
Newfoundland and Labrador (Maloney 1990).
3.2.2 Alloc.'lUon of gesources -.Sharing lhe JYIe
By the time Canada gained control of the 200 mile limit the management of
fisheries by Total Allowab le Catch (TAe) was an internationall y accepted means of
managing groundfish resources. Canada adopted the national allocation approach of
ICNAF and adapted it II)its domestic Iiect (Parsons 1993:114).
3.2.2. t Total Allowabl e Ca tches
Following the extension of jurisdiction Canada was also faced wi th a major
problem with respect to stock assessment because in orde r to set a TAC it was necessary
to know thesize of the biomass o f various stocks . Canada opted fo r a conservative level
of fis hing mortality approximat ing 20% of the fishable biomass known as Fo.! for its
groundflsh resources. For Northern cod, the TACs were set be low the Po.! level to
accelerate stock rebuilding. In retrospect these attempts werein vain as an over-estimation
of biomass led to TACs and catches which were nearly double the des ired level of fishing
mortality (CAFSAC 1987).
In effect , the assessmen t process defines how much resource is availab le and the
level o f exploitation (eg. FG.I) determines the total allowable catch (size of the pie).
Despite the difficulties in setting appropriate TACs and managing with in establis hed limits,
the assessment of groundfish stocks and the setting ofTACs in annual management plans
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became the cornerstone of groundtish management during the late 1970$ and 198Os.
Despite the problematic past and lack of success in terms of biological management, the
TAC system of management is still widely accepted today. However , once it is
determined how much can be harvested, the conflict between user groups over how the
resource should be allocated or shared intensities (Harma and Smith 199 2).
3.2.2.2 Sharing the Pie
The sharingofTACs into national allocations by ICNAF in 1971 wasa departure
from the common property nature of fisheries. Canada again adopted this method of pie
sharing in its fisheriesmanagementprocess in the post-19n period. A major management
crisis occurred at the time of extensionof jurisdiction with the collapse of the Gulf rodfish
resource and resulted in the removal of Nova Scotian and Newfoundland vessels from the
redfish fishery in the Gulf of SI. Lawrence. The excess harvesting capacity that was
removed from the Gulf in 1977 was subsidized by the federal government to fish for
Northern codoff Labrador (this will be discussed in detail in section 4.4). This "shifting
the burden" approachwasto become commonplace during the 1980s and continues today.
Following the extension of jurisdiction in 1977 the removal of foreign fleets
provided access to enough fish to solve most domestic allocation problems . However, as
the Canadian capacity to harvest expanded, the conflict between competing users
intensified. The total allowablecatch for most stockswasdivided between the inshore and
offshore sector with each .sector getting its own quota. The "race for the fish" in the
offshore sector eventually lead to an enterprise allocation system in 1982 Wherebyeach
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company received an individualshare of the overa lloffshore quota and could plan its
harvestingin terms of its fleet and its markets.
The inshore sector in most of Atlantic Canada continued to operate on a quota
systemwhilethe inshore fisbery for Northern codin 2J+3KL operated on an allowance
which, becauseof seasonaland geog raphic fluctuations in fish migration andabundance,
wasnecessaryto allowthe fishery to continueafter the share was harvested. The inshore
allowancewas one of the few quotas in Atlantic Canadawhich was not fully harvestedor
exceeded onan annual basis. In retrospect, the inability of the inshore sector to harvest
its allowanceshould have been a warning to resource managers sinceit was reflectiveof
the low levelof the resource.
3.3 T heFisheries Resource Allocation Pr ocess
T he process or mechanism for allocating fisheries resourcesvaries considerably
depending upon the resource, the users and the institutional arrangements in place. In
1977, when Canada assumed responsibility for managingthe resources within the two
hundred miles, there were no formal mechanisms to allow for consultation with the user
groups o r stakeholdersin the Atlantic fishery. However, "with the introduction of
resource allocation....the clash of co nflictinginterests becameapparent , so did the need
for structuredconsultation." (Parsons 1993:463)
The Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee (AGAC) became the flagship of a
process basedupon localconsultations feeding into regionaladvisory committees which
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then fedintothe Atlantic-wide advisorycommittees. This processgrewduring the 1980s
and by lheend of that decadethere were 11committeesin the Newfoundland region, 34
committeesin theScotia-Fundyregionand 46 advisorycommitteesin the Gulf (Parson~
1993). In addition,the Federal-ProvincialAl1antic Fisheries Committeeand the Atlantic
Council of Fisheries Ministersdealt with resource management and policy issues.
The purpose of the consultation/advisory processwas identified in 1986 by the
Department of Fisheriesand Oceans in a paper on reforming theconsultative processas:
I. To advisethe principal usergroupsand the provincial
governmentson the basic direction and content of the
proposed management plans; and
2. To arrive at a broadly-based consensus on the major
elements of these plans, particularly with respect to the
sharingof the fish quotasamongthe different user groups.
(Parsons1993: 466)
It is noteworthythat the essential purpose of the process designed to manage
fisher ies resources was to deal with "sharing of the fish quotas among different user
groups,' The fight over allocationovershadowed all otheraspectsof resource management
suchas conservation. Thoseexperiencedwiththe AGACconsultative process believe this
conflict eventuallyled to its derailment (L. Dean 1995 PeTS. Comm.).
The process of consultation was in retrospect much more than a mechanism for
input into management decisions. It revealed majordifferences in regional input as
indicated by the difference in the number of committees on a regionalbasis andin the
strength of the different user groupsin terms of theirability to use the process to their
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advantage. Thelatter hasimplications for issues suchasinshore/offshoreshar es especially
durin g the cri ticalperiod of the lale19705(Parsons 1993:463).
3.4 Principles of Allocation
The debate over resource allocationis o ften intense andhas historicallybeen the
cause ofconflictbetweenusers andregions (Hanna 1994 ; Hanna an d Smith 1992; S mith
1994; Stevensona aI. 1994). Thealloca tiondebate over Northern codintensified as the
amountof fish available wasred uced.an d the conflictoccurredin manygeo graphic areas
and at manygeographic scales, ranging from the international conflic t (Sullivan 1989; Day
1995; Rowe 1993) to the intense domestic struggle betweenregionsand communities
(Mart in 1994; Steele et al. 1992; Vardy 1994; Maloney 1990; Go vernment of
Newfoundland and Labrador 1987). Domestically, the allocation of th e groundfish
resourceincreasingly becameth e major sourceof conflict througho ut Atlan tic Canada in
the years following the declaration of the200 milelimit. Bitter andinten se deba tes
between inshore/offshore interests, gear types, regional groups and provinces were part
of the processof developing a groundfis h management plan. Specificaly. the allocation
deba te in the late 1970s and early 19805 centred on; "I) tllegeneral inshore/offshore
splits; 2)access tothe Gulf of St. Lawre nceby largetrawlersbasedoutside the Gulf and
3) inter-pro vincial rivalry betweenNew foundland and Nova Sco tia about theshare of
North erncod andwhere Northerncod catchesshouldbe landed" (Parsons 1993: 122).
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To reduce the annual conflict and ad hocdecision making, the Gove rnment o f
Canadadevelopedasci o f allocationprinciples which weredesigned10 p rotect the interests
of the user groups. The allocatio n principle wasOReOr several overa ll princip les in the
annual groundfish management pl an and stated:
Allocation offishery resources win be on the basisof eq uity
taking in to accoun t adjacency to the resource, therela tive
dependency of coastal com munities and!he various fleet
sectorsupona given resource, andeconomicefficiency and
fleet mobility(AtlanticGroundfishManagement Plan 19 84).
These principles weredesignedtopr ovide a basis for resource a llocation decisions
during the 1980s; however, as this thesiswill show, theywere nolalwaysadhcred to o r
applied consistentlyon a regional basis. Th e lack of agreementbetw een user groupson
major allocation issues resulted in such issues ending up "on the M inister ' s desk for
decision" (parsons 1993: 157).
It is also interestingto no te that s ince the crisisof theearly 1990s the ' baste
principles"of the AdanticGroundfis h Management P lanchanged to "guidelines" in 1993
andtwo special clauses havebeen added.
X II. Adjustments in the insho re/offsho re ratios for
particular stocksmay beco nsideredby theminister.
X III. Allocations maybe madefor special programs in
specific stock areas included within the Canadian qu ota
(Atlantic Groundfish ManagementPl an 1995).
Bothof thesemeasureshave increased lhe po werof the Ministe r or Fisheriesand
Oceans and have led10a greatdeal ofunce rtainty withrespect to futu re allocations.
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Ch apter 4: Past Allocations of Northern Cod
It is apparent tha t (he p oll cles eDuDdaled by the
Department or FMeries and Oceans and e pressed lu the
Gro undrlSh Manegement Plan' s have beeaonly wordsOn
paper to be ignored o r disregarded a t wlll. (St eele et aI
1992)
The pUlpose of Ihis section is to documentthe allocatio n andcatches of N o rthern
cod since Canada took management control following th e declaration of the 200 mil e limit
on Januar y I, 1977, up to collapse of thestock in th e early 19905, and thesubseq uent
d ec laratio n of a moratorium on co m mercial harvestin g on July 2, 1992. During this
fi fteen year period Northe rn cod w as consistently at the ce ntre of the controversy
surround ing Canada's management of Atlantic fisheries and was therefore subject toa
n umbero f taskforces, special studies, andpub lication s withrespect to its management.
In almost al l casesthe aIbcation of the resource between regions, fleetsectors, gear types
a nd the splits between the inshore and offshore sectors were t he focal points o f these
reports. The alloc ations to various user groups and their resultant catch is given in
Appendilt oneand showngraphicaly in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
These figures area resultofco mbining and manipulating the various databases that
e x ist and p resenting thesedata in a form that addresses the stated objective concerning
re sourceal location decisions.
Since thesettingofthe TAe impacadirect ly upon the allocation p rocess, th e first
section wi ll review the scientificadvi ce and T ACs with respect to Northern cod. The
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Figur e 4.1 : Inshore, Canadian Offshore and Foreign Allocations of Northern Cod 1977 -
1991.
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Figure4.2: inshore, Canadian Offshore and ForeignCatchesof NorthernCod 1977-1991.
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secondsectionexamines the slatedobjectivesandpri nciplesof allocationand is followed
by an overview o f how the TAe wasallocatedby Canada 10 foreign nations and to the
domestic inshore andoffshoresectors.
4.1 Setting theT otal Allowable C atch
Following Canada's extension ofjurisdictlon, the adoptionof the TAe as a means
for fisheriesmanagementposeda very difficult proble m; TAes arc set basedon harvesting
a certain percentage of the total fishable biomass. thus it is essential that the size of the
biomassbeknown. This requirement ledto a rapid increase in fisheries stockassessment
by theDepartment of Fisheriesand Oceansin thepost-1977 peri od. Since Canada didno l
havea time series ofrcsearch vessel surveys prior to 1977 and theCanadianoffshoreOcc(
hadlittle or nopresence in the Northernrod fishery be forethis dale, the assessmentof the
Northern codstoc k in the 1911to 1986 period was conducted by the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization(NAFO). Canadian scientists participated in the NAFO scientific
process and gradually acquired a time-series of Canadian research vesselsurveysand
Canadian offshorecatchtale datathat enabled tbem to carry o ut tbeir ownassessmentsin
1987(DFO 1988).
Unfortunately, during this transition period very optimisticresource projections
lead to in tense p ressure with respect to the future a llocation of theNorthern codstock.
Theseprojections resulted in non-surplusallocationsto foreign countries, allocations to the
Canadianoffshore sector and tonew users from other regions. Duringtheearly 1980s it
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also becameob viousthat lhe inshoresector wasnot seeing an increasein the resource.
In fact theinshore fixed gearfisheries, a sec tor which hadtraditionally harvested 200,000
to250,000mt. o f Northe rncodin the1860- 1960period was unable to catch its 115,000
mt.allocation du ring the 1980s. Initialy, the failure of theNorthern cod stock to migrate
inshore wasblamed on cold water (CAFSAC 1986) but lhe inshorefailureworsenedand
leadto theappointment of the AlversonTask Force on Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries
in Augu st 1987. Also, in December 1986, the Newfoundland Inshore Fisheries
Association {N IFAl released a report it had commissioned by fisheries scientists a t
Memorial Universityof Newfoundland. Th e Keats Report rai sedvery serious concerns
over the uscof offshore catchrates in the estimation of biomasssize and that the stock
biomass had been consistentlyov er-estima ted (Kea ts i t at. 1986). The retrospective
analysis conducted by CAFSAC in 1988 illus trates the magnitudeof the problem [Iable
4.1). If Canada hadknown that in 1981 the TAC sh ouldhave been 120,000mt . instead
of the250,00] mt . advised bythe NAFOSciendfc Council the TACwou ldnot have been
setat 200,{XX) mt . Theover-estimation ofT ACs in the early 19805resultedin high levels
of exploi tation through the alocationof non-surplus fish to foreign countries and the
allocationinexcess of 100,000mt. of Northern cod to the Canadianoffshoresector. Both
of lhese decisions hada verydetrimenlaleffect on the traditionalinshore sector .
In allocating the No rthern cod TAC, the inshore sector wasaccordedfirst priority;
'theinshoreallocationis takenoff the top (ie. theinshore sector getsthe first slice of the
pie)"(DFO 1989) . However, in reality, the inshoresector never receivedil!l share. For
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example, in 1989whenscientists discontinued using offshorecatchrates and recommended
a TAC of 125,000 mt. the Minister of Fisheriesand Oceans set the TAC at 235,000
tonnes. This resulted in a catch of 254,000 mt. with Canadian and foreign offshore
mobilegear vessels catching 150,555mt.. Not surprisingly, the inshore fishery failed to
harvest its allowance, but through increasedeffort, smaller mesh sizes and moving further
from shore it managed to catch 102,869 mt. offish, much ofvery small size (CAFSAC
1992: 19). The small size was also evident in offshore catches.
w hho the setting of appropriate TACs and the interaction between science and
fishermen is critical to future management(Finlayson 1994), it is no: the subjectof this
thesis. Yet, the fact cannot be ignored that the level of the TAC indirectly affects the
allocation process especially when stocks are over-exploited and at low levels of
abundance. Undersuch circumstancesmobilegearvessels are able to maintain catch rates
by hunting for fish while passive fixed gear catches invariably decline. The role of
scientistsin sening TACsand the implications for allocation issues were highlighted inan
address by Mr. Cabot Martin at the 1994 annual meeting of the Ame.ican Fisheries
Society:
If the cod comes back every inshore fisherman knows that FPI and
National Sea will be back, too. But this time we know the fatal
consequences of a half-fought battle;this time wewill be ready; and
this time, if Godgivesus a "lhis time", I hope to see more fisheries
scientists on our side of the barricades(Martin 1994).
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4.2 Foreign Allocations and Overfishing
The declaration of the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on January I,
19TI was expected 10 bring about an end to thc over-exploitation of Ihe Northern cod stock
by foreign fleets. However, foreign harvests of Northern cod have continued and even
increased during the 19805. Foreign catches arc of two types; those occurring within the
Canadian EEZ through bilateral agreements with Canada, and those occurring outside of
200 miles in the area known as the "Nose of the Bank", Canada's management of the
Northern cod fishery since 1977 has always been a fine balancing act of allocating
resources inside the zone in return for market access and/or cooperation in not fishing
outside the lone. The allocations to foreign countries inside the 200 mile limit, the
subsecnen t catch and the "illegal" catch outside the zone in the 1977 to 1991 period arc
shown in Figure 4,3. The allocation and catches by country are given in Table 4.2 . The
foreign allocations inside the Canadian zone was a very controversial issue with respect
to Northern cod in the late 19705 and early 1980s as Canada took responsibility for the
management of the Northern cod stock (Parsons 1993; Harris 1990). In 1977. Canada
extended jurisdiction but ' treated 1977 as a transitional year. Accordingly, it adopted the
TAC and national allocations agreed to in ICNAF during 1976" (Parsons 1993: 244)
therefore, foreign countries were allocated 90,000 mt. of the 160.000 mi. TAC. In
retrospect, the TAC for 1977 at the FOollevel of fishing mortality should have been only
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45.000 mt. (CAFSAC, 1981). Thus in restrospect the foreign allocation represented
fidling at twice the desired level of fishing mortality.
During the 19n 10 1980 period the "surplus· allocations of Northern cod
decrca.scdfrom 9O.0CI0 mi. 1025.(0) mt. and by 1981increasing Canadian effort meant
there was no longer any "surplus". In the 1981 to 1981 period Canada allocalcd non-
surplus amounts of Northern cod 10 foreign countries in return for market access and
cooperation in conservation of straddling stocks and highly migratory species such as
salmon (Sullivan 1989. Parsons 1993. Day 1995). During the early 1980s the euphoria
of the projected growth of Northern cod stock began 10dissipate as the inshore sector
consistently failed to harvest its allowance of 115 ,000 mt. The TACs. which were
projected to grow to 400,000 mt. at F O,I . peaked at 266,000 mt. and. in light of the
consistentoverestimationof the biomass. shouldhave been much lower.
The pressure: to reduce non-surplus a1locatioos to foreign nations increased as
Canada's offshore: fleet beganto harvestall of its allocation (Kirby 1983). ConsequenUy,
during the 1982 to 1986 period, fishing outside of the 200 mile limit beganto increaseas
Canada nolonger hadthe surplus resources to "buy· thecooperation of other nations.
The European Community (ac.) wasthe main beneficiary of the non-surplus
allocations of Northern cod as the result (If a long-term agreement (LTA) signed with
Canada on December 30. 1981 to extend 10 December 31. 1981.
This Agreement exchanged. inter alia , quotas in canadian waters
for E.C. vessels for tariff quotasat reduced rates for fish products
of interestto Canadianexporters. An integralpart of the LTA was
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thai Canada gave theE.C. catch quotasof non-surplus Northerncod
from within the Canadian zone on the understanding that E.C.
membernations would not fish for this speciesor NAFO managed
stocksoutsidethe 200 mile limit beyond the quotas set by NAFO
for the EC (Sullivan1989: 121).
Thisattemptto buycooperation failedandceproblem of overfishing the Northern
cod stockoutsideof 200 miles escalatedduring the 1982 to 1986 period (Parsons 199] ,
Lear and Parsons 1993, Sullivan 1989). 1985 proved to be a critical year for Canada's
foreign allocation policy when oceanographic conditionscaused an unusualabundanceof
fish 10 occur outsidethe 200 mile limit on the Noseof the Bank. Having harvested its
shareof the LTA inside thewoe, the Federal Republic of Germanybegan fishing outside
the zone andharvested15,000 mt. of Northern cod in excess of its quota. The following
ytlar Spain and Portugal, which had consistentlyoverfishedtheir allocations, joined the
European Community (lear and Parsons 1993). Unfortunately, the harvesting capacity
of the Spanish and Portuguese fleets could not beaccommodated within Europeanwaters
and theexclusion of theSpanish from other areas such as Namibia meant that the Spanish
and Portuguese targeted the unprotected area outside of Canada's 200 mile limit (Day
1995). This led the E.U. to consistently use the "objection procedure" at NAFO. In
essence, this allows any member not agreeing with Ius quota to "object- and set its own
unilateral quota. In the case of Northern cod, the E.C. used the objection procedure
continuouslyfrom 1986to 1992. Despite the filetthat NAFO agreedto a moratorium on
fishing codoutsideof 200 miles in 3L, theE.C. set unilateral quotas for the 1986to 1991
periodfor a totalof346,360 mt. while reporting to NAFOa catch of 206,123 mt. for the
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sa me period . Canadian estimates place the catch at higher levels, for exam ple, in 1991
the E.C . reported a catch of 22,835 mt. of Northern cod whereas the Canadian estimate
was 41 ,900 mt (CAFSAC 1992).
In summary, Canada initially began a phase-o ut of foreign vessels through surp lus
a lloca tions (though retrospectively these allocations were not truly surplus) in the late
1970s and during the early 1980s Cana da tried to use non-surplus alloca tions o f Northern
cod to get other nations 10 limit the ir catches outside of 200 miles, The 1986 to 1992
period resulted in increased conflict with the European Community, and the o verfishing
o utside of 200 miles intensi fied. Follow ing Canada 's dec laration o f a mora torium on
Northern codon July 2, 1992 an agreeme nt to respect the moratorium was reached with
the European Community.
T he only allocation of Northern cod to foreign countries since the expiry of the
LTA in 1987 has been 10France. In order to get France to ag ree to a bou ndary sctUement
in area 3Ps the Gove rnment of Canada granted France an a llocation of Northern cod
not withstanding the strong opposition of the fishing industry and the Gove rnment of
Newfoundland and Labrador. In Lhewords of then Premier, Brian Pec kford, "They sold
the shop!"
4.3 Inshore Allocation
T he history of the inshore sector was essentially the history o f the Northern cod
fishery up until the development of foreig n factory freeze r trawlers in the 19505. The
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inshore sector operated on a seasonal basis using passive fixed gear which exploited the
cod stock during its spring and summer migrations to coastal waters. The catch was
subjectto annual variations but in the 1850to 1950periodusuallyranged between 200 ,000
to 300,000 mt. (Lear and Parsons 1993, Harris 1990). With the.expansion of the foreign
offshore effort in the 1950s and 1960s total catches soared to 810,000 mt. in 1968. By
1974, Ute inshore catchplummeted to 34,000 mt. as the result of the stockcollapse. The
declaration of a 200 mile limit meant that the historically dependent inshore sector, and
thecommunities which were nearly totally dependent upon the Nonhero cod stock, finally
had hopes of renewed control of the resource, and expansions were made in both thc
harvesting and processing sector to reap the economic benefit of a rebuilt Northern cod
stock.
The concept of first priority in allocation of the TAC to the inshore sector was
repeatedly stated in the 1977 to 1980 period with, then Minister, RomeoleBlanc slating
the following with respect to Northerncod allocations:
1 have a clear bias for the inshore fisherman, not becauseof some
romantic regard, not because of his picture on the calendars, but
because he cannot travel far after fish, because he depends on
fishing for his income, because his community in tum depends on
his fisherybeing protected (Parsons 1993: 123).
Subsequently, the Department of FisheriesandOceansreleased resource projections
for the Northerncodstockwhichforecast1985 landingsof 400,000 mt. at FO.1 or 350,000
mt. if an exploitation ratebelowFu.l wereadopted(DFO (978). This stock was projected
to be the major growth area for all Atlantic Canada and offshore vessels, displaced from
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the Gulf, were subsidized to fish for Northern cod in 2J+ 3KL. Meanwhile , at the special
Government · Industry seminar on the management and allocatio n of Northern cod in
August 1979 the then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, the Honourabl e lam es McGrath ,
stated that:
(he Northern cod were the staff of life to the people of Northeast
Newfoundland and Labrado r.. •that the policy of the govern ment
was that the inshore fisherman had first calion this resource (Lear
and Parsons 1993: 66).
The paper on the utilization of Northern codpresented at the seminar estimated that
the inshore sector would beable to harvest only 230,000 mt. and therefore based on the
350 ,000 mt. which would be available in 1985 , 120,000 tnt . wou ld be available to the
Canadian offshore sector and foreign nations through bilateral agreements (DFO 1979).
With respect to allocation the seminar concluded that
The first and overrid ing priority in allocations is to the inshore
sector. The consensus from the seminar participants was that two
thirds of the TAC of Northern cod should be set aside as an
allowance for the inshore fishery (DFO , 1979).
The Province of Newfoundland disagreed with the deci sion to introduce new users
and argued that
The inshore could and should take up to 85% of the Northern cod
catch and that any residual should be taken by Newfoundland based
offshore effort to supply resource short plants in Newfoundland
(DFO 1979).
Both. pos itions assumed a stock capable of supporting a 350,000 to 400 ,000 mt.
TAC by 1985. Given the euphoria as sociated with gaining control cf this vast resource ,
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the allocations of 25.000 mt. per year to foreign countries and 120.000 rot. per year to
newentrants in the formof Canadian offshore wetfishtrawlers were not initially seenas
a problem. However, the stockprojectionswere subsequentlyreviseddownwardsand the
fact that the inshore sector was unable to catch its allowanceof I 15.000 rot. during the
early 1980s meant that increases in theTAC went to the Canadianoffshore sector. The
resultwas that the inshoresector, whichwas promised first priority in allocationand were
supposedto get two thirds of the TAC was, by 1986, receiving only 43% of the TAC as
an allocationand, due to the low level of the stock and foreign harvest outside200 miles,
wasaccountingfor only26% of tile total catch (Appendix One). During the 1982 to 1988
period the inshore sector faced repeated catch failures and hired their own scientist to
argue that the TAC was not realistic. The dramatic shift in the scientificadvice which
resultedin a recommended TACof 125,000 mt. at Fa.l for 1989(CAFSAC 1989) would
havepermitted only an inshore fishery if the scientificadviceand the allocation policies
hadbeenfollowed;however, theTAC issue became very political and the final 1989 TAC
was announced by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans at 235.000 mt. down from
266,000 thepreviousyear and withall the cuts borne by the offshore sector. The inshore
fisherycaught95,000 mt. in 1989or 37% of the total catch of 254,000 mt. The TAC for
1990was set at 199.282 rnt. with the cuts again borne by the offshore sector, however,
theTAC farexceededthe advice of the OFO scientists, the Harris Panelor the level that
the stock could sustain (Steelea at 1992: Hutchings and Myers 1994; Martin 1995).
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The 1991 to 1993TACs wereset on a three year plan which would see the TACs
gradualy rerluc:ed symbolically from 190,(0) mt. in 1991 to 18S,lXX) mt. in 1992 andto
180,OCKJ mt. in 1993. Again thc.seTACs were of political origin and did not reflect the
scientifc advice or the long standing commitment of priority allocation to the inshore
sedor (S!rele tl al, 1992:Martin 1995). The allocationand catches of the inshore fixed
gear sector are given in Appendix one and shown graphically in Figure 4.4. Given the
reuospccuve error in ~t1ing TACs in the early 1980sand the political TACs of the 1989
to 1992 period, it is clear thatdespitethe promises and priorities, the inshore sector never
became the beneficiaryof the ' recovery"of the Northerncod stock associated with the 200
mile limit. From 19n to 1992the inshore sectors allocation accounted for 50 9f, of the
total accumulative TACs and the inshore fixed gear catchwasonly 42.5 lJIi of the total
catch or Northern cod. In hindsight, the consistent failure of theinshore sector and the
fact thatits catch in the 1m to 1991period averaged only 89,000 mt. shouldhave been
surrtcient evidence to seriously question thehealth of the Northerncodstock. Despite
newtechnology, better vessels, better gear and new modem processing facilities, the
inshore sector which traditiona lly caught 200,lXXl to 300,000 mt. could not catch its new
reference point of 115,000 mil The percentageallocation to theinshore in the 1m to
1991 period never reached the two thirds recommended by the Northern cod seminar in
1979 or the 85% recommendedby the provincial government (FiguTC 4.5). It is also
worth noting that the 2/3 allocation was based on catching 230,000 rnt. of the projected
landings of 350,000 mt. by 1985.
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In summary, liteNorthern cod stock never recovered to the point wherethe needs
of otherusersshould havesupersededthe inshore's "priority altocauon". By the time the
biological reality becameapparent, however, mostof Atlantic Canada's offshore fishery
hadbecomedependent upon Northerncod and the inshoresectorsconcernsand demands
wereeither ignored or treated the same as thoseof the growing number of other users
competingfor their share of liteNortherncod stock.
4.4 Offshore Allocation
Sincethesectormanagement planappliesto all inshorevessels < 65 ft. and vessels
over 65 ft. operateon AUanlie-widelicences, all vessels greater than65 fl. arc considered
offshore for the purpose of this analysis. The allocation and catches for the various
offshore sectors is given in AppendixOne and shown graphically in Figure 4.6. The
Canadian offshore sector consists of predominately mobile gear vessels (98% of total
offshorecatch)usingottertrawl technologyto harvest fish in the offshore area, primarily
duringthe winter and early spring. This is the limewhen Northerncod form dense pre-
spawning and spawningconcentrations. Prior to 1977 the Canadianoffshorefleet had no
significant presencein theNortherncod fisherywithcatches in the 1960.'1 and early 1970.'1
being in the range of 2000 mt. per year as a by-catch in the flounder fishery in 3L
(Parsons 1993).
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Figure 4.6: Canadian Offshore (>65 ft.) Allocation and Catches of Northern Cod. 1977 - 1991.
AI thetimeof the declaration cf lhe 200milelimit, theoffshore sector, consisting
ofmainly sidetrawlersfromthe southcoastof NewfoundlandandNovaScotia, were in
themldstof a resource crisis due 10 declinesin their traditional fishingareasin theGulf
of St. Lawrence. TheGulf redf ish andcodstocksuponwhichthis fleet and their plants
depended hadcollapsed and the resultantlo w TACswere not Cdpable of accommodating
bothGulf-based andnon-Gull-based users. Theinshore sector in theGulf of St. Lawrence
argued thattheywerecapableofcatchingall theTACsin theGulf despite thc fact that the
offshore vesselsfrom the Southcoastof Newfoundland and the Scotian shelf for the
previous decade harvested 60% of their catch in the Gulf. The "solution" to the
overcapacity problemin theGulf wasthe Northern codstock oITthe Northeast coast of
Newfoundland andLabrador which wasprojocted togrowrapidly (OFO 1978). The 19TI
Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan wasthe first by Canadaand "attempted to address
!heproblemof resource shortage in theGulfby pushing the moremobile Nova Scotiaantl
Newfoundland-based trawler fleets out of the Gulf and encouraging the Gulf based
offshore trawler fleet 10fish outsidethe Gulr (Parsons 1993: 120).
Inannouncing the 19TIplan. theHon. Romeotcatancstatedthatthe Gun-based
"intermediateandsmall beats, morethan 10,000of them, had only limitedrange. Hence,
the large trawlerfleethad theduty andopportunity of going further arlCld". In fact, the
Government of Canadasubsidizedthe offshoresector to fish for Northem cod in thelate
1970sbecause of the uncertainty with respect to the viability of Canadianvesselsfishing
codduring thewinter off thecoastof Labrador; thus, uecvercapeciryproblemin the Gulf
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was solved by wining the offshore sector out of the Gulf. In 1979 the non-Gulf-based
vcw:Is' cod allocations in the Gulf were again reduced "in order to provide for adequate
flShingopportunities for existing vesselsin the Gulf" (Parsons 1993: 125). Consequently,
Uteovercapacity problem wasnot solved, it wasmerely wifted from the Gulf of St.
Lawrence to !he Northeast coast of Newfoundland and Labrador where the resource
prospects were supposed 10 be better. This processof ~sh i fti ng the burden" continued
throughout the 1980s as Northern cod becamethesolution to resource problems elsewhere
in Atlantic Canada.
The Canadian offshore sectors share of the Nonhero cod stock increased rapidly
from 11% in 19n 1o)5% in 1981 and by 1986 accounted for 55% of the allocation (See
Appendix Oneand Figure 4.6). Becauseof thesuccessof the offshore sector, a number
ofnew usersand Ileersectorsbecame 'itopart of theNorthern cod fishery in the 19805with
new allocations to vessets in the 6S to 100 ft. classwhich wereresourceshorton the
SCotian Shelf. The Kirby TaU. Force report recommendations resulted in allocations10
a newcJassof "Scandinavian" Ionglinersas namedin theKirby Reportandalso allocations
to theResourceShort Plant Program (RSPP); bothprograms were designed to catch fish
offshore and deliver it to inshore "resource shon" plants on the Nort.'least coast of
Newfoundland which were seriously impacted by the · failure" of the inshore fishery.
Again resource-snort plants elsewhere in AtlanticCanada were included in this program
which was expanded 10ensure25% of the total RSPPallocation went to plants outside of
Newfoundland and labrador (Parsons 1993).
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The offshore sector 's entry into the Northern cod fishery was the focus of the
Northern Cod Seminar in Corner Brook in August 1979, and the success of the offshore
sector in catching its allocations in record time resulted in increased quotas and the
introductionof an enterprise allocation program for mobile gear vessels greater than 100
ft. During the early 1980s it wasdifficult not to admire the successof the offshore sector
which was landing in excess of 120,000 rot. (250 million lbs.) annually and which only
a few years earlier had required subsidies and incentives to fish the Northern cod stock.
However, in retrospect, theoffshore sector's successwas like admiring the pumpwithout
knowing what was in the well (Leopold 1948).
The offshore catch rateson spawningconcentrationswere usedby NAFO and DFO
scientists to calculate the Northern cod biomass and thus the TAC, however, this was
discontinued in 1987 when it became clear that thecatch rate was a function of tcchnology
rather than an indicator of abundance (Keatsa (II. 1986; CAFSAC 1987). Thus, between
1980 and 1987 the offshore catch rate \..:d to TACs which were too high and, therefore,
increasedthe offshoreshare. The refusal of the Government of Canada to set TACs at the
stated management objective of Fo,1in the 1989 to 1992 period also increased the share of
the offshore sector. During the L980s it was apparent that the o ffshore sector received
special consideration due to its ability to catch itsquota and employ a large number of
peoplewhilethe inshorefixed gear sector fell into a cycle of inshore failures, make work
programs and a high dependenceon Unemployment Insurance.
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Chapter 5: Impactsof Allocation Decisions
May tencluded by slatiDc be was UDSUI"f sudt a
bil'urcattds)'Stem (lmhorelolTshon) could 1UIR. and IIlaI
lbe govmunen( 1IIus1 decide on trbether or not tbtrt
§hall be . popubl ion 00 1M northern part 01 1M east
tlmt ofCan:lda(Ot. A . ltb y, April 1981 DltfDora ndum
to KirbyTask Fom as quoted m Shrank 1995).
The allocation of li~he rics resourcescreatesaeatmosphere of winnen andtoses
since ueallocalion of a 1111 of fishtranslates into eeooomic valueand SlIbsequaltly social
benefit. In 1988 l,lXXJ mi. of codwasestimated to mate 17 person years of employment
in me inshore sector and 10have a landedvalue of$460 per Ion (DFO1988). These
numberswill beused 10conducta preliminary assessment of the economic value aJId
employment associated wilh the allocationprocess. The spaliaI shift inthe allocation of
Northern codhad impacts OlI lhe inlernatiooal, national, regiooaI and local levelsand these
impadSwiJl beeuminedin lennsof the 5lift in aJ1ocationsandlandings in the 197710
1991 period. Afurtherevaluationof themted goals and objectives ill the allocation cl
Northern ax! willalsobeexamined with respect toactualda:isionssince many of tile
goals and obj ectives were based onsccioecnomiepolicy.
5.1 Stated Objectins V5. Actual Decisions
The sLaled objectives of allocation of the Northerncod stock are veryclearly
capturedin the management plans, ministerial speeches, press releases and reports of
specialseminars during thetate 1970s. The social andeconomic obj ective wastorebuild
lhe Northern cod stock ror the benefit of inshore fishermenwho were adjacent to the
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resource andhistori cally de pendent upon it. T he insho re fixed gear secto r was to be given
"fin! pri o rityin al location" or "first canon the fish' . Based on the alloca tions an d catches
forthe 1977 to 1991 period, it is obvious that thisobject ive was never realized. In fact ,
ju st the op posite occurred .
In 1977an abrupt shiftoccurrcd in the spatial scale of management of the Northern
codresourceas a 200 mile limit enc losed the bulk o f the resource fur C anada an d shined
managementresponsibility fromthe internatio nal to tile national scale. Unfortuna tely, this
occurred simultaneously with severe resource shortages in the Gulf o f St. Lawre nceand
alsoat a timeof o verly optimistic resource projections forecasting a majo r increase in the
Northern codstock io a TACof 400 .000 mt. at Fu (DFO 197 8) which was the basis for
allocations to th e Canadian offsho re sector and fo reign co untries. Th ese e rror-laden
projections were also the basis of the subseque nt mi smanage ment and over-exp loitation
between 1917and 1988. Since the Northern cod stock wasgoi ng to grow to allow a TAe
of 400,000 mt. b y FO,11985 (350,000 mt. a t a lowe r exploitati on level). it was seen as a
developmental o p portunity . It was estimated that the inshore sector would on ly beable
to harvest 230,000 mt.o r roughly two third s of lhe T AC and . therefore, a min imum o f
120,000 rot. wo uld be available to new Canadi an use rs and foreign flee ts (DFO 1979).
The allocations we re made to the Canadian o ffshore sector and foreign fleets on the basis
o f these p rojectio ns. When the fish failed to material ize in the inshor e seco r, the firs t
reaction was to explain it as a seasonal fl uctuation brought about by cold water o r
abundance ofcape lin offshore (CAFSAC 1986) . This was generally accepted because the
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Canadian offshoresector and foreignvessels had noprob lemcatching their allocations.
In retrospect, basedon the revised TACs provided byCAFSAC (Table 4.1) , the TAC at
FU_1 in the 1977 10 1992 period would never have been highenough to ha ve allowed
allocations to theCanadianoffshoresector or fore ign fleets.
The biological impact of the al locations was significant since the rebuilding
objec tive was toachievea spawningbiomassof 1.2 million metric tons toensure thelong-
term viabili ty of the resource (DFO 1989). Initially , following the e xtension of
jurisdictionconsiderable rebuild ing occurred. However,over-exploitation fro m Ihe ear ly
1980s to 1992 resulted in very little ifany rebuildi ng andeventualy lead 10co llapseof the
stock (Figure 5. 1). If therehad beenadherence to thestated goals and obj ec tivesof the
late 1970s, this cver-exptoltanc n wouldnot have occurred since the inshore sector would
not likely have been ab le 10exert enough fishing pressure to cause the stock to decline.
5.2 Economic Impacts on Fleet Sectors and Regions
Thesocial and economic impact of Canada's allocation dec isions on the inshore
secto r was also severe. Between 1977 and 1991,3 17,202 mt. of Northe rn cod was
allocated 10 foreignnations. The subsequent total foreign catch of 546 ,997mt . transla tes
into9.299 person years ofemploymenIand $251,700,670 of landed valuein 1988 dollars
Table 5. I), Likewise , the Canadianoffshore sector was allocated 1,327, 835 mt. and
harves ted 1.2 86,187 mi. which equates to 21,865 person years o f employment and
$591,838,948 landed value in 19 88 dollar s.
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Figure5.1: NorthernCod SpawningBiomass 1962 - 1994.
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Obviously, the inshore sector wouldnot havereceived the entire amount of thevalue or
employment associated with the allocations10 other nat ions or the Canadian offshore
sector . But notwithstanding the potential availability of fish, the allocations10 other
sectors contributed to a poor inshore fisheryin the 19 805, one characterizedby catch
failures, make work programs andabuses of the Unemployment Insurance Progra m.
Despite thestated goals and objectives, other regions of AtlanticCanada with moredive rse
economiesand countries on the other sideof th e Atlantic received a greater combined
benefit fromCanada's management andallocation of the Northern codstock lhandid the
inshore fishermen in th e coastalcommunities adjacent to and historically dependent upon
the resource.
5.3 Spatial Shift in the Distribution of the Landings
Inadditionto sharingthe economic andemployment benefits betweensectors, the
allocation process also directly affected thegeographic dist ribution of the Northerncod
landings. The concepts of adjacency and historic dependence of fleets and coa.stal
communities, while. writteninto thegroundfishallocation principles, were ignored(Steele
tlal.I9(2). Fr om 1977 to 1991asignificanlgeographic redistribution o f Northern cod
landings was evident. Figure 5.2 illustrates the changes in redistribution of Canadian
landi ngsof N orthern cod between 1978 and 1988. The increased levels of landings in
Nova Scotia an d theSouth coast of Newfoundland werethe result o f theallocationsto the
Canadianoffshore sector. Between1977 and 1991 NovaScotia received 273,358 mt.
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Source: DFO Stat istics 1978 - 1988. St. John ' s. NF.
Figure 5.2: Regional Distribution of Northern Cod Landings 1978 & 1988
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of Northern cod which equated to4,647person years of employment and a landed value
of approximately $126 million dollars (Figure 5,3) despite the fact Nova Scotia was
neither adjacent to nor historically dependent upon the Northern cod resource,
Meanwhile, oommunitieson the labradorcoast andthe Northeast c(W1of Newfoundland,
whichhad beenbuilt on the basis of hundredsof years of harvestingNortherncod, were
no longer major players in the Northerncod fishery(F igure5.4). The facllhal by 1988
there were no communities in 2J or 3K in the lOP 15 landing ports was the result of
increasedallocation s 10the offshore sector,
The allocationofcod to tileNewfoundlandoffsho re sector resultedin nearly year-
roundemployment to communities withoffshoreplants such as Ramea, Burgee, Gaulrois,
GrandBank, Fortune, Harbour Breton, Marystown and Arnold's Cove. Likewise, on the
Northeastcoast, communities withoffshoreplants such as Catalina, 51.John's, Trepasscy,
Harbour Grace prospered, with total landings of up to 80,000 mt. per year, While the
economic valueof Northern cod to thesecommunities cannot be ignored, it must be
remembered that most of these communitiesand their fishplants were nol built on Lhe
basisof the Northern cod resource and hadbeenhistoricallydependentupon thecod and
redfishstocksin the Gulf (4RST) and onSt, pierre Bank (3Ps)and the cod, haddockand
flounder stockson the Southern Grand Banks (3NO). The expulsion of the onshore fleet
from the Gulf in 1977 led to the first offshore allocations of Northern cod, with the
FederalGovernment subsidizing the fleets to fish in the North. Subsequently, the failure
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of NAFO to manage the straddling stocks on the Grand Banks (Rowe 1993; Day 1995)
resultedin the further declineof the tradiuenal resourcebase of theoffshorefleet during
lhemid-l980sto theextent that the Newfoundland offshore sector became almost totally
dcpcndcntuponNorthern cod by the late 1980s. Thus, when faced with a recommended
TAC of 125,000 mt. in 1989, the then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans stated ~ I can' t
dose down entire oommunitiesor regions of Atlantic Canada". In essen ce , the altocation
decisions of Ute late 1980s werenot about sharing a growing resource, they were instead
focusedon securing access to and maintaining shares of a declining resource. In effect,
theGovernment of Canada's politically-motivated setting of the TAC through the 1989 to
1992 period was in effect "robbing Peter to pay Paul", Since there were no new fish to
allocate, there was no alternative but to keep the offshoreallocations in place by artificially
inflating the TAC while at lIIesame time doing nothing about the unregulated foreiCn
l1arvest outside of 200miles.
In summary, the benefits of the limited growth in the Northern cod stock in the
post1mperiodwerenot allocated10theinshoresector which hadtJaditionally depended
upon this resource for survival. In the 19n to 1991 period inshore communities
throughout Labrador and the Northeast coast of Newfoundland survived on make work
projects and ~"J'CCia1 assistanceprogramswhile the allocations decisions of the Government
of canada resultedin4,647 person years of employment in Nova Scotia and even greater
benefits to offshore communities, primarily on the south coast of Newfoundland, which
received in excess of 17,000 person years of employment. Furthermore, the allocations
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to foreign countries and the uncontrolled harvest ouuide of 200 miles co mbined to a tou t
catch of Northern cod by foreign nations which equates to 9,299 person years of
employment.
A rev iew of past actions taken and the consequences of mose actions, however
unintended, arecriticalfactors in the fonn ul3tion of future goals for fishery management.
The fai lure to adhere to slated goals and objectives with respect to the priori ty of the
inshore has resulted, at least in the near ter m, in the commercial extinction of the major
fish resource in the North West Atlantic and the economic failure of hundreds of rural
communities in North eastern Newfoundland and Coastal Labrador . Ironically this was
predi cted by Dr. A. May in 1983 when he stated that -the government must decide on
whetheror not there shall be a population on the northern par1o f the cast Coast of Canada
(Shl.mk 1995).
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Chapler 6: Faclors in the Fulure Allocation of Norlhern Cod
6.1 Statements of Goals and Objectives 1971 to 1992
The statement of goals and objectives is an essential part o f natural resource
management. Clearly definedgoalsand objectivesare uncommon in fisheriesmanagement
(BaIber andTaylor 1990). When goals have been stated. they have been very generaland
refer to objectivessuch as bestusc, rationalization or conservation. These goals are "good
for public relations and politicalgamesmanship but are difficult as use in effective rational
managemen t" (Barber and Taylo r 1990: 366).
Unlikemany fisheries resources the Northerncodstock was to be managed on the
bas is of a number of stated goals and objectives which included the biological goal of
rebuilding the spawning biomass to 1.2 million metric tcnnes (DFO 1989) (see Figure
5. t), andsocialandeconomic goals suchas allocating the inshore fishery two thirds of the
tolaIcatch, an estimated230,000 of the projected350,000 mt. TAC (400,000 rot. at Fe.l )
(OFO 1979) . Unrorun.atety, these biological and socio-economic goals and objectives
were never realized or adhered to . In fact, there is considerable evidence of goal
displacement as other objectives superseded allocation priori ty to the inshore and stock
rebuilding. In order to examine the time periodin detail, an evat-ation of the TACs and
major repor ts such as the OFO Northern Cod Seminar, the Kirby Tas k Force, the
Alverson Task Force and the Harris Panel was conducted. It is proposed that the fisheries
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allocation/management processfor Northerncod in the19n to 1992 period can beviewed
in three distinct phases;
l} Euphoria Phase: 1977 to 1981
• Very optimistic resource projections.
- Phase out of foreign fleets.
• Statements of priority allocation to the inshore.
• Workshops on how to share the future catch of 350,000 10 400,000 mt.
- Resourceproblems in Gulf were addressedby the growing Northern cod
stock.
2) Uncerta inly Phase: 19821 01988
- Offshore crisis and restructuring with in excess of 100,000mr. of
Northern codal loca ted 10 get enterprise allocations in place .
• Sectormanagement implemented to restrict movement of vessels < 65 ft.
• Inshore fishery consisienuy failing to catch its 115,000 mt. allocation.
- Scientificadvice less optimistic but still projecting growth.
- DFO Science used to explain thc failure of the inshore fishery.
- AlversonTask Force on failure of inshore fishery.
- Offshorecontinues to land its quota and report incredible abundanceof
fish on the offshore banks.
-larger inshorevessels begin to moveoffshore to areassuch as the Virgin
Rocks.
- Traditional inshoreadaptsgear andeffort to harvest 70,000 to 80,000 mi.
per year, however, much of the catch is small fish.
3) Crisis Phase: 1989 to 1992
- January 1989 - Scientilic advice for a TAC of 125,000 mt. in 1989down
from a TAC of 266,000 mt . in 1988.
- Stock at low level with low levels of recruitment.
- Offshore contendsstock is okay.
- Inshore agrees with scientists.
- DFO sets TAC for 1989 at 235,000 mt. the tola!catch is 253,000 mt.
- Inshore sector (NIFA) takes DFO to court to stop offshore harvest and
loses.
- Harris Panelreviews scienceand the stock and confirms the low level of
biomass.
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- 1990 TAC set at 200,OOO mt.
- There is a 3 year plan of TACs for 1991-93 of 190,000 , 185,000, and
180 ,000 rot..
- Stock collapses with small fish taken by all sectors.
- Offshore fails to catch its quota.
- Fishery closed on lul y 2, 1992.
The statements of goals and objectives for Northern cod were all made during the
Euph or ia Phase (1977 to 1981), However , the actual allocation decisions significantly
departed from the intended objectives as a result of the resouree crisis in the Gulf, bilateral
arrangements with foreign countries and restructuring of the offshore sector . During the
uncertainty phase (1982 to 1988) the TAC remained stable and therefore the allocation
process was relatively problem-free with the major issue of content ion being the
determination of the size of Ihe stock, the failure of theinshore fishery and access by other
regions (Keats et al. 1986: CAFSAC 1986: Alverson 1987; Government of Newfoundland
and Labrador 1987). The goals and objec tives and , indeed, the principles of allocation
were also ignored as was evident in the quota increases to the Canadian off shore sector,
the middle distant fleet and the Resource Short Plant Program. At the same time, new
users such as Nova Nord were demanding allocations of Northern cod and perm ission was
granted to National Sea Products to use a factory freezer trawler to harvest Northern cod
(Parsons 1993; Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 1985).
The crisis phase (1989-1992) is where the lack of adherence to goals and objectives
became blatantly obvious and ultimately manifest in the collapse of the resou rce and the
management process. In 1989, when faced with a recommended TAC of 125,000 rot.
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whichwasfar belowthat requiredto satisfythe manydemands.then Minister Tom Siddon
refused toac.cept thcadvice because: oftheallocatioa implications (and set an interim TAC
while the Harris Panel reviewed the situation). The 1990 report of the Ham s Panel
confirmed the scientific advice and recommended a reduaxl TAC; this key
recommendation. whichwasthebasisof thereport. wasnot accepted by OFO. In the 31f.t
yea.-s following the advice for a 125.000 mt. TAC, the totalcumulative harvest exceeded
700.000 mt. much of it beingverysmall fish. Finaly. the resourcecollapsed in June 1992
and the stockwasclosed to commercial fishing fora periodof 2 years. The moratorium
has now been extended indefinitely. The primary cause of the problem has been thai in
a timeof crisisthe Department of Fisheriesand Oceans abandoned its own policies (Steele
t l ol. I992).
6.2 Fut ure Allocations, Goa ls and Objectiv es
Prior to and since the moratorium there have beennumerous stal.emenls of goals
and objectives for the management and allocation of Northern cod . The following
provides an overview of the staled allocation policies put forward in recent studies and
statements;
6.2. 1 Harris Panel's Independenl Re,ie" of the Sta te of the Northem Cod Siock
Released in February 1990. the Harris Panel Report extended well beyond its
original terms of reference and examined me stockas a whole. In the area of resource
allocation the Panel recommendedthe following:
17
thai.theprinciplesof adjacencyand of essentialneedsbeadopted as
a fundamental premise underlying quota allocations (page 6,
Executive Summary),
the Panel alsoidentifiedtheneedfor goals in the fisheries management process and
recommended:
19. That the Governmentof Canada shouldcarefully re-examine its
biological, ecologicaland socio-economic goals in respect of the
fisheries to ensure that they are clearly defined, internally
consistent, and attainable.
While the recommendations were general, the text of the report was much more
specific with respectto allocation:
II is still apparent that we should draw a distinction between
conditions of stockabundance whichall reasonable expectations for
accesscanbe met and conditions of stock.depletionwhen no need
can be wholly satisfied. In the Newfoundland context, it would
seem altogether appropriate that first preference for access should
in all cases go the communities contiguous to the resource and
whose survival is historically dependent upon it. In such
circumstances it might well beappropriate to consider the adoption
of a doctrine analogous to the Hague Preferences.... to take into
account the vitalneeds of local communities particularlydependent
on fishing. .•(Page 4Q..41) .
6.2.2 DunneReport on the Implementation of the Hanis Panels Recommendatlo!\S
The DunneTask Forcewasestablished in June 199010ensure the implementation
of the Hams Panel's recommendations. The Task Force recommendationswith respect
to resource allocation were as follows:
Allocation priority to the inshore sector.
Historicaldependency and adjacency to be priorities in future allocations.
Allocationof futurequota increasesto more selectivegears.
We recommendthai the list of goals proposedhere be taken as a minimum
starting point for further discussion with industry.
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6.2.3 Government of Newfoundland Bnd Labrador - Cbanging Tides
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador detailed its position on the
allocationof Northern cod in 1993in its Changing Tides document:
Clearly defined fisheriesallocation principles must guide fisheries
management, and adjacency to the resource and historical
dependencemustbetheunderlyingprinciplesin resource allocation.
In the case of the 2J,3KL cod fishery, the Province holds firmly
that the traditional inshore fleet sector should receive, on an
allowance basis, priority in the management of this stock; and at a
TAC level below 100,000 tonnes the Province will support a by'
catch provision for the offshore fishery. The resource allocation
policy for this stock, should it exceed 100,000 tonnes. should be
guidedby the federal/provincial pcollc hearings processconducted
in those regions of the province which have had a presence in the
Northerncod fishery.
6.2.4 Cashin Task Force on Income and Adjustments
The Task Force on income and adjustments in the Atlantic fishery (Cashin 1993)
has made the following statement with respect to resource allocation:
Capacity reduction should be based on the principle that coastal
areas would maintain priority access to resources upon which they
have traditionally relied. For example, for northern cod there was
a traditional inshore allowance (for vessels less than 65 feet) of
115,000 tonnes. Principally, the harvesters for this were from
along northeast coast of Newfoundland and the coast of Labrador.
It is unlikely that there will be a directed offshore fishery for
northern cod in the future until the total allowable catch approaches
or exceeds the traditional inshore allowance (Cashin 1993: 40).
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6.2.5 Minister of rlSheries and Oceans
In a speechto the 51. John's Board of Trade on October 11, 1995 the Honourable
BrianTobin slated:
Now, I believe and I remain committed to the notion of a mixed
fishery withinshore, with mid-shore and withoffshore sectors, but
I want to repeatan assuranceI've already given, and that is that. as
fisheryresourcesrebuild, inshore fleets will begiven first access to
thoseresources.
6.2.6 Summary of Curre nt Allocation Goals
Based upon the preceding quotes the inshore sector should receive priority
allocation in the future. These stated goals and objectives reflect the samephilosophical
viewsas thoseexpressedin the late 19705,however. thespecific goals and objectives have
not been clearly identifiedexcept for those involving the first 100,000 mt. The questions
that remain unanswered includewhether the Government of Canada will allocate Northern
cod to foreign nations in the future to control the fishery outside of 200 miles or whether
thceffshorc scctorwill beallocated Northern codonce the TAC exceeds 100,000 mt.; Of
willexemptionsto sector management allow inshore fishermen from elsewhere in Atlantic
Canada to access the inshore allocationonce the fishery reopens.
6.3 Allocation and Capacity Reduction
6.3.1 "Too ma ny Fishermen , cllasing too few rLSh".
This is the oftenstatedcliche to describe the Newfoundland inshore fishery and it
is estimated that upwardsof 50% oi fishermen must leave the industry (Cashin 1993).
However. in seeking a balance between the number of harvesters and the availability of
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theresourcethereare twosides to the equation (eg. number of fishennen and the amount
of fish). The Department of Fisheries and Oceans controls both sides of the equation
through its licencing policy and its allocation policy and. therefore, will decide Ihc
balance. The rebuilding of Northern cod stock offers a series of choices as summarized
by Steele et a11992:
It is necessaryto discuss and plan for the level to which the
stock will be rebuilt. and at the same time determine how
the stock will be harvested and by whom. Otherwise,
projections about how many fishers.... .are unwarranted
(Steele etat. 1992: 65).
Thus the rationalizationor capacityreduction processcan only take place after the
goalsandobjectivesof resourceallocationareagreed. For example. the inshore fishermen
in the2Jareaof coastal Labradorhave never exceeded the amount of fish available in anu
harvestedfrom area21; however, allocations to the offshore sector, foreign countries and
inshorevessels fromotherareasresulted in a reduced resource which could not meet their
economic needs. Therefore, the resource allocation issue is paramount to the
rationalization exercise, especiallyon a regional basis.
6.3.2 Regional Balance
The proposed rationalization of the offshore and inshore sectors of the Atlantic
fishery must take place on a regional basis in line with the resource potential of each
region, otherwise the overcapacity problems will be addressed by allocation from one
regionto another. Th.is-shifting the burden"is a major impediment to capacity reduction
sincethere is no commitment that makingdifficult decisions now will result in improved
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resource availability later. In fact, experience over the past 15 years has clearly
demonstrated that allocations willgo to areas with the greatest demand or political clout.
The erosionof the sectormanagement policy (Maloney 1990), lack of adherence to stated
allocation policies(Steeleet al. 1992), and the move away from allocation "principles" to
the more flexible "guidelines" (Atlantic Groundlish Management Plan 1995) are all
preventing localand regionalrationalizationand creating great uncertainty in the industry
since there are no li rm commitmentswith respect to future allocation.
6.4 National vs, Regional Allocation Pr iorities
'rte managementof Northerncodover the past 18 years as a Canadianor national
resource continues to cause numerous conflicts between federal and provincial
governments. Theallocationissuehas invariably beenat the centreof these conflicts. The
Governmentof Canada hasallocatedNortherncod to foreign countries as part of bilateral
trade agreements in return for market access. It has allocated Northern cod to other
Provinceson the basis of projected growlh in the resource and it hasallocated Northern
cod to other sectors, regions and harvesting technologies to the strong opposition of the
Government of Newfoundlandand Labrador (Parsons 1993).
These conflicts will not go away and the solution appears to lie in clearly
identifying allocation objectives and goals so that each sectoral and regional share is
protected. The increasing demands for more local (Pinkerton 1989) or regional (Vardy
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(994) input are the result of the past ad hocapproach to management which resulted in
spatial shifts in resou rces between communiti es , nc:et scctcrs , regions. provinces and
nations. In the words of the Cashin Task Force , "ltli is is no wayto decide the future of
coastal.areas and the resourcesuponwhich they have traditionally relied' (cashin 1992 :
65).
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions
The Governmen t of Canada should cartfuUy re-examine its
biological, ecological and soclo-eccncmte goals in respect of the
fISheries to ensure they are clearly defined , iDfemaUy consistent
and attainable . (Recommendation 19. Harris et aI, 1990:153)
7.1 The Future Management of Northern Cod
The most comprehensive overview of the Northern cod stock undertaken was the
-Indcpcndcnt Review of the Staleof the NorthernCod Stock" by Harris erat (1990). This
repo rt recommended that goals and objective.. be established for the future management
of the northern cod stock and stressed that with respect to allocation, "the principles of
adjacency and of essential needs be adopted as a fundamental premise underlying quota
allocation" (Harris et ai, 1990:6). The "Report of the Implementation Task Force on
Northern Cod" (DFO , 1990) completed later the same year stated that "the priority of
allocation access to inshore fishermen should continue" and that "the principle of historical
dependency and adjacency should be continued and guide future allocation decisions"
(DFO, 1990: 14) and recommended that "allocation priority to the inshore sector" be a
socio-economic goal (page 15). Two points are worth noting: firstly, the priority of
a llocation to the inshore should s:ao..Linuc and principles of historical dependency and
adjacency should tllll1i.n.l.I:. The report uses the word continue as if the inshore was
receiving priority and the principles were being adhered to, yet the inshore share of the
catch in 1986 had fallen to 26% of the total. Secondly, the recommendation of priority
allocation to the inshore sector was made inOctoberof 1990. Within months of receiving
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this report,the Minister of Fisheries andOceans announceda three year management plan
for the Northern cod stock for the 1991-93 period of 190,000 mt, 185,000 mt. and
180,(0) mt. whichwere approximately double the scientific advice. This resulted in the
inshore share of the allocation and catch being 61% and 47% respectively in 1991.
The vast difference between the statementsof theory and the quantitative reality
was the major problem in the allocation of Northerncod.
Throughouthistory, even when goals were articulated. they
tended to be very general with little specificity. Lackey
(1974) acknowledgedthat fisheries arc managed an ' son
objectives" (goo.ls) suchas ' test" or "wise" usc. These types
of goals are good for publie relations and political
gamesmanship, but are difficult to use in etrccnve. rational
management (Barber and Taylor, 1990:366).
The past management of the Northern cod stock was, with the exception of the
1979 report, devoid of any specific quantitative goals and objectives with words like
"priority· being used without any referenceto amounts or percentages. Likewise, while
historic dependencyand adjacency have been principles of allocation they were never
clearly defined. For example, adjacency meansbeing in close proximity and it could be
argued that while Nova Scotia is not contiguous 10 the Northern cod stock it may be
consideredmore adjacent than New Brunswick. Given the importanceof these wards in
the allocation debates, it is essential thai they be defined and articulated clearly and
concisely. In future it is also essential that goals be stated clearly and concisely and also
in a quantitative manner whieh will enable an evaluation of the success in atlaining the
goats and objectives.
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The Northern cod stock is but one of nearly 50 groundfish stocks managed in
Atlantic Canada, and the problems in its past and future management arc inherent
throughout the Atlantic grouncfish fishery. The December 1995 report of the Senate
Standing Committee on Fisheries entitled "The Atlantic Grcund fish Pishery: Its Puturc"
states that
"w hat has been sorely lacking over thc years is a larger,
clea r and consistent conception of what federal fisheries
managementpolicy should be accomplis hing, and a strategy
on how to achieve those objectives .. ..Too many in the
industry believe that issues especially those concern ing
licencingand fish allocation have been, over many years.
resolved by political means in favour of the more well
organized and powerful industry groups .
The Senate committee goes on to recommend
The Committee recommends that the Depart ment of
Fisheries and Oceans issue a clea r vision statement and an
explicit statementof fundamental and guiding principles for
managing the Atlantic fisheries, including clearly expressed
objectives with respect to employment in coastal
communities.
The Committee recommends that inshore fisherie... have
priority access to the resources upon which they have
traditionally relied. The rules for re-opening fishing
grounds should clearly stipulate that in the case of
groundfish usually harvested by both the inshore and
offshore sectors, no offshore harvesting take place until the
inshore has fully recovered. Offshore fisheries for
groundfis h should be permitted to resume only after a
tho rough consultation with inshore fishermen (Govt of
Canada, 1995, page 38).
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The SenateCommittcc's's reporthighlights the need for clearly stated goals and
objectivesand makes strongrecommendationswilh respectto future allocation issues.
7.2 Areas fur Fu ture Research
The study of fisheriC$ resource management poses many potential research
questions cspcciaIly in theareaof resource allocation. This thesishasexaminedallocation
decisions from a qualitative andquantitativeperspective for the Northern cod stcck and
evaluatedthe management by comparing staled goalswith the actual decisions. This
research begins to fill the research gaps identifiedin 1981 by Draperand, sinceNorthern
cod is butone oflIlc nearly50 commercial groundfishstocksin AlIantic Canada, there are
significant opportunities foradditionalresearch , especially for stocks such as turbotwhich
is curreeuy subjoct10intensecoollictoverallocations between nationsand sectorsand has
paralleb with the Northerncodcrisisof the 1980s.
Prom a spatial perspective, the impact of allocationdecisions upon regions Of
communities is a majorareaof applied geographic research . Ferexample,by euminitli
the resource available to a region or community, geographers can assessthe impact of
a1Joc:ation decisions and identify issueswhich need to headdressedto ensurecommunity
stability. The developmentof a methodological approach to regional or community
auocauoneand stabililywould have major significance(rom an applied perspective in
terms of the rationalization of the current overcapacity problems facing the fishing
industry.
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7.3 Summa r)' and Recommendation
The past management of the Northem rod stock can bedescribed as a process of
"muddling through ". The biological and socio-economic goals were never dearly staled
and ucse that were , were neither adhered to nor auained . In Chapters l -ti the problem!!
of fisheriesnanagerem and allocation havebeenexamined in the cootcxr of the Nortbcrn
cod stock . The stated goa ls and objectives were identified from Task Force Reports ,
policy docu ment s and other sources such as ministeri al speeches and co nsistently reflect
a bias or pre ference towards the traditiona l insho re fishery sector. The analysis uf
allocations and catch es ove r the 1977 to 199 1 period reveals , howeve r, a completely
dif ferent bias. The Inshore sector never experienced the expected bcnenu fm m the
rtmYeryof lhcNonhem codS10ck following the 200 mile limit beca use the stock did nut
reco ver to a leve l which would have ensured a cons istent inshore harvest at its historic:
level of 200 ,000-250,000 mt. During the 1980s the consistent failure o f the inwne
fishery resulted in numerous studies to explain why the codfish did not migrate to inshore
waters. Yet, retrospective analysis ofpasl biomass estimates and TAC 's and the low level
of spawn ing biomass reveal s the true reason for the failures as being the absence o f
sufficient biomass. Th e entrance of the Canadian offshore fleet and the continued eve r-
explo itation by foreign nations also affected the inshore in terms of both allocati on and
catches. Yet, the Department of Fisheries and Ocean s consistently allocated the northern
cod resource in a manner whi ch disregarded their own slated objecti ves of allocation and
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ignoredihc complaintsof inshorefishermen who stressedthe fact that "you can't catch it
twice ".
The recentstatementsof the inshore sector's priority accessto the first 100,000-
115,000 ml. with any surplus being made available to the offshoresector and foreign
nations alsoreflectsa degreeof goaldisplacementsince the referencepoint for the inshore
harvest hasshiftedawayfromthe 1979level of 230,000 mt.. This thesis has documented
thepastallocations andcatchesin terms of the statedgoals and objectivesfor the Northern
codstockandprovidesa method of conductinghindsight evaluations of resource allocation
issues. The shift in allocations and hence catches between sectors and also between
geographic regions is the source of turmoil, conflict and unrest in the management of
Atlantic Canada's fishery. The fulure resolution of such conflicts depends upon the
development and implementation of clearand concisegoals andobjectivesin the biological
andsocio-economicmanagement of theresource. The Fisheries Resource Conservation
Council has begun to establish the criteria for future biological management of the fish
stocks, which will include goalsand objectivesin terms of biomass size, protection of
spawners and minimumfish sizes. Unfortunately, the identificationof futuregoalsand
objectives by the Government of Canada in the allocation of fish resources has not
happened to date.
Thisanalysis illustrates that, despite statedgoals and objectives, the allocationof
Northern cod from 1977 to 1991 resulted in a shift in access to resources from the
traditional inshore sector to theCanadian offshore sector and to foreign nations. Despite
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the inshore's "priority" it did noI. receive the projectedbenefit due 10 the lack of adherence
by the Government of Canada to its own allocation policy. In order to ensure thai the
stated goals and objectives of allocationare adhered to in future, it is essential that they
beclearly slated and reviewed annually in terms of the actual catches.
Based uponits adjacencyand historic dcpcndencc:, the: inshoresceIor musthave: sole:
access to the Northern cod resource as it rebuilds. The ability of the inshore sector10
employlargenumbers of peoplewillalsoaccomplishgovernment's employment objectives
froma social and economic perspective. While there is considerable debate with respect
10therecoverytime for Northerncod, it is essential thatthepriority of the inshore be "cast
in stone" and quantified before the fishf:l\ "eOpens, otherwise. the lobby from non-
traditional users will again result in the erosion of the inshore's share. Given thai
hundreds of small isolated communities throughout Labrador and thenortheastcoast of
Newfoundlandare dependent upon the Northern cod stock for lheir economic and social
survival it is imperative that future management and allocation nol be a process of
"muddling through".
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